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A Critical Analysis of International Financial Institutions’ 
Understanding of Political Corruption: A Focus on the IMF, World 
Bank, and the ANC 
 
"Comrades!" he cried. "You do not imagine, 
I hope, that we pigs are doing 
this in a spirit of selfishness and privilege?” 
Orwell, Animal Farm 
 
Abstract 
This dissertation argues that the IFIs’ understanding of corruption, and thus their 
anticorruption and good governance policies and prescriptions, is based on the 
conceptualisation of corruption as a state centric phenomenon. As such, they are not 
concerned with corruption as a systematic problem. The IFIs’ definitions and views, 
although legitimate, prudent, and legal, are actually the road to ineffectiveness. But 
broader and more effective policies would require the IFIs to delve into domestic 
politics. Such political involvement would entail a great deal of risk on their part, and 
would be beyond their mandate and their appetite.  
In order to demonstrate this, this dissertation presents an overview of political 
corruption and the important role of the party in both the causes and consequences 
of systematic political corruption. The focus is on the relationship between the 
political party and the various systems of governance. The case of the ANC in South 
Africa is used to analyse whether an understanding of political corruption is 
necessary. The conclusion is overwhelmingly that it is. The case of the ANC 
highlights the importance of political parties and the manipulation of political power 
involved in corrupt relationships. The South African political system is a cause of 
corruption and is open to abuse. The bureaucratic, electoral, and party systems all 
have a bearing on the nature of corruption in the country.  In particular, the 
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The dissertation demonstrates the systematic nature of corruption and highlights 
certain characteristics and conceptualisations of corruption that the IFIs do not 
address. 
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1.1 Research Question: 
What are the strengths and weaknesses of the views of international financial 
institutions, represented by the IMF and World Bank about corruption? What can we 
learn from the South African experience of corruption, specifically the ANC’s 
involvement with corruption, that relate to the views of the international financial 
institutions’ views? 
1.2 Problem Statement  
The views of the IMF and World Bank about corruption are neither identical nor 
static. But here the basic tendencies in their thinking will be taken as similar and 
representative of international financial institutions.  
The IMF and World Bank tend to see corruption, including the corruption of political 
parties, as a barrier to development, indeed a cause of underdevelopment. The 
views of international financial institutions on this matter are vital: these institutions 
have the power not only to define an issue but to implement a range of policies in 
tune with those views. 
IFIs of course have an understanding of corruption that, although shared among 
scholars and other studies, is complex. Some of their views have solid footing but 
other views of IFIs’ can be doubted or are not necessarily accurate. The validity of 
the IFIs’ views is more than just a scholarly debate; these institutions implement their 
views via, for example, SAPs. If these views err about the causes and consequences 
of corruption of political parties, these programmes are likely to suffer. 
The selected case is the ANC in SA since 1994. What can be learnt from the South 
African experience that reveals the problems of IFIs’ interpretations of the causes, 
characteristics and consequences of political corruption?  
Electoral systems in Southern Africa are primarily dominated by dominant-party 
systems. Since majority rule the BDP has dominated politics in Botswana, Zanu-PF 
Zimbabwe, and SWAPO Namibia. This one party dominance is, as said above 
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dominance has broken down, the consequences of ZANU-PF’s corruption are now a 
major factor in its resistance to hand over power.  
Since 1994 the ANC has become the dominant party in South Africa. Corruption may 
well have been an under-recognised feature of the NP rule; after all, in pre-1994 SA 
the NP showed all the characteristics of a one-party dominant system. Added to this 
is the kind of corruption typical of a negotiated transition of power. 
Since 1994 a great deal of attention has been devoted to the ANC’s corruption. The 
corruption around the Arms Deal takes up the greater share of this literature. News 
of political corruption is almost a daily occurrence in South Africa, and the problem is 
said to be worsening1.  Although they may be valid, my concern is not with popular 
perceptions of the ANC’s corruption.  
There is also a great deal of attention to the consequences f the ANC’s corruption 
on the party itself. One line of argument is that corrupt behaviour destroys party 
unity. The history of the ANC as a revolutionary, moral party contradicts its current 
image in the popular press. Another line is about the potential political 
disengagement of talented youth when they witness the party’s corruption. This 
focus is, however, also not the primary concern of this paper.  
The ANC is justified as a case in this study as it demonstrates the systematic nature 
of corruption. Whilst the level of involvement from the International Financial 
Institutions (IFIs) in the South African economy is limited, the analysis of corruption 
by these institutions is worldwide. There are in fact very high profile cases of World 
Bank involvement in South Africa, including the ESKOM investment, which has had 
allegations of corruption levelled against it.  
1.3 Thesis Statement: 
This dissertation critically examines the causes, characteristics and consequences of 
political corruption as understood by the IMF and World Bank, considering how, if at 
all, these views relate to political corruption in and around the ANC.  
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The dissertation argues that the IFIs’ understanding of political corruption is defined 
by IFIs’ state-centric political mandate. This mandate, which directs the IFIs to deal 
with corruption only in far as their own activities – lending to governments as 
representatives of states - does not allow IFIs to delve into a country’s domestic 
affairs, including the corruption in and among the business sector and society. Thus 
IFIs’ view of corruption is state-centric; that is, they do not dig into the domestic 
arena. It is understood that IFIs’ involvement within the domestic political system 
would have negative political consequences as they are not directly accountable to 
the local population. One could thus expect the IFIs to refrain from such digging. 
The IFIs have given increased attention to corruption but their understanding has not 
developed much beyond general good governance prescriptions for state-based 
programmes.  What the South African case shows is that state based anti-corruption 
programmes, to be effective, have to understand domestic p litics. The corruption in 
and around the ANC further demonstrates the importance of political parties in their 
role in the manifestation and prevalence of corruption in a country.  
1.4 Definitions and Approach 
Corruption is one of the greatest obstacles to economic and social development. It 
distorts the rule of law, weakens a nation's institutional foundation, and severely 
affects the poor who are already the most disadvantaged members of developing 
societies2.  
Joseph Nye’s seminal definition of corruption is “a political act... [that] deviates from 
the formal duties of a public role (elective or appointive) because of private-regarding 
(personal, close family, private clique) wealth or status gains: or violates rules 
against the exercise of certain types of private regarding influence”3. A more refined 
definition is “the illegitimate use of public roles and resources for private benefit, 
where ‘private’ often refers to large groups such as political parties”4.  
The approach taken here is informed by economic theories of corruption and human 
behaviour. The assumption will be that corrupt behaviour is a result of ‘utility 
                                            
2 World Bank (1997) ‘Helping countries combat corruption: The role of the World Bank’ Washington 
3 Nye, Joseph (1967) ‘Corruption and Political Development: a cost benefit analysis’ American Political Science 
Review 61: 2 
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maximising’ or ‘self interested’ actions5. As such corruption is viewed as a logical 
thing, a rational decision, rather than as a character flaw. Utility includes personal 
power and political advantage as well as financial gain. The problem of corruption is 
that it presents a “failure to tap self interest for a productive purpose”6. Corrupt 
behaviour occurs because there is a lack of restraint, and a lack of framework to 
prevent it.  
The IMF and World Bank will be taken to represent international financial institutions. 
There have been four ANC presidents of South Africa, but the analysis in this 
dissertation splits ANC rule into two periods. The administrations of Mbeki and 
Mandela are combined because Mbeki was the dominant influence in both 
administrations, as Deputy President and then as President. This period also 
includes the interim presidency of Kgalema Motlanthe. The second period covers the 
Zuma administration which has been markedly different as the party has become 
less centralised and more populist.  
The liberation movement with seemingly unimpe chable moral backbone of Nelson 
Mandela now has a party leader previously charged with corruption, fraud, money 
laundering and racketeering. The ANC has lost some supporters over its corruption 
allegations, however it is still the dominant party in South Africa and that does not 
look set to change.  
1.5 Methods and Evidence 
The basis of critical analysis within this dissertation is the South Africa case. The 
case exposes the strengths and weaknesses of the IFIs’ understanding and policy 
towards corruption. 
The research is structured around the IFIs’ understanding of corruption and the 
case-study. The intent of such a design is to (a) structure the case along lines 
suggested by the perceptions and understanding of corruption of the IFIs’; and (b) to 
test whether the analytical elements (for example, on causes of phenomena) and 
predications are upheld by the case. 
                                            












C. Vandome: VDMCHR002 Dissertation 23/1/2013 
10 
 
The analysis that begins the dissertation focuses on the broad theories and concepts 
of political party corruption: that is the various theories that have been employed to 
explain and predict the causes and consequences of corrupt behaviour within the 
political system. Then the views of the IMF and World Bank on the causes and 
consequences of corruption are tested. Obviously, these views apply primarily to the 
causes and consequences of corruption in countries seeking financial aid from the 
IMF.  
The South African case-material is organised around the causes and consequences 
of the ANC’s corruption at the level of the party itself; the government; and the 
economy. The political party-government relationship is explored with a view on, the 
electoral, bureaucratic and dominant party systems.  
In the examination of causes, the discussion is structured around the constraints and 
stimuli of corruption. The constraint-stimuli framework thus operates in the 
relationship of the ANC with the government and the ANC’s relationship with the 
economy. 
The method employed is a qualitative analysis. The research focuses on the 
processes, systems, relationships, and institutions of political corruption. Many of 
these elements are difficult to quantify. As such this dissertation is a descriptive 
analysis of corruption at the theoretical level and in the case of South Africa. The 
study looks at an issue where evidence and data referring to actors’ motives and 
behaviour are hard to identify or are unavailable. This has an impact on the available 
resources for the study.  
I draw on a variety of material. In producing a framework through which to analyse 
corrupt behaviour in the party I primarily use secondary literature and theoretical 
works on the subject of political party corruption and corruption within southern 
Africa. To portray the definitions and views of the IFIs I use some analysis presented 
in the secondary literature on the subject, but draw mainly from the resources and 
publications of the institutions themselves. Since the institutions do not in fact have a 
common definition or view of corruption I focus on commonalities in the reports, 
working papers, and other documents published by the institutions to produce a 
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In the analysis of the case itself I deal with secondary literature as well as accounts 
of corruption and documents surrounding the cases of corruption within the party. I 
use material from NGOs, Watchdogs, and international organisations on the topic, as 
well as secondary literature addressing the issues with which I am concerned.  
1.6 Literature Review 
There is a small but growing body of scholarly studies of corruption in South Africa.  
There is a reasonably-sized secondary literature on how international financial 
institutions like the IMF and World Bank view corruption. Often this literature is 
dominated by scholars who agree with the diagnoses of these institutions. 
There is an extensive literature on the issues surrounding corruption. My focus shall 
be on those that address the issues of party political corruption with which I am 
concerned. 
During the 1960s the attitudes towards corruption w re split into two groups: The 
‘moralists’, who regarded corruption as a harmful impediment to development and 
eroding the legitimacy of institutions. This group of authors included Myrdal, Wraith 
and Simpkins7. In contrast to this was a group of authors who were regarded as 
‘revisionist’ as they viewed corruption as providing a way to bypass inefficient 
regulation, speed up procedures, and allow political access to be purchased by the 
excluded.  
The current literature on the subject is dominated by the World Bank and the reports 
which it produces. The bank identifies corrupt behaviour in developing countries as 
one of the primary obstacles to economic growth. Given the nature of the 
organisation there is less of a focus on the political implications of corruption, or the 
erosion of democracy. In terms of combating corruption, the emphasis is on the 
“Institutional Restraints on Power”, overlooking the logic of Mauro that it is not in the 
interest of those benefitting from corruption to put in place the institutional constraints 
upon it, hence the difference between the level of rhetoric and policy in South Africa. 
                                            
7 Myrdal (1968) ‘Corruption: its causes and effects’ Asian Drama: An enquiry into the poverty of Nations vol.2 
New York: Twentieth Century 
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One of the main cleavages in the literature is the different attitude towards corruption 
between economists and political scientists. Economists see it as an economic 
problem; whereas political scientists see it as a political problem. The importance of 
this dichotomy is self-evident; the way in which one views the problem has a direct 
impact on the way one constructs the solution. The two sides of the debate follow 
two correlations of corruption. Corruption is more prevalent in low income countries. 
Corruption is more prevalent in countries where there is a low degree of democracy. 
There is a consensus in the political literature on the importance of the state in 
economic development. The state is an important aspect in development either as 
an aid or a barrier. The same is true for any study of corruption. Any assessment on 
corruption must take the political characteristics of a country into account. The 
debates focus on the regime type and the strength of institutions. Does it make a 
difference whether a state is democratic or authoritarian? Are states development 
orientated or “neo-patrimonial”? 
The theoretical role of the state is less important in economic theories of corruption. 
The focus here is on the individual incentives and constraints. As with most market 
relationships, corruption is seen as a transaction8. The problem with such micro 
analyses of corruption is that they focus on the individual at the expense of 
understanding the group mentality and behaviour that yields corruption. This is one 
of the important factors in the debate surrounding the IFIs. 
Empirically there are two important correlations. Corruption is more prevalent in 
countries with low income and where democracy is weak. Addressing these results 
separately provides very different interpretations of the causes and consequences of 
corruption. 
Corruption as a political phenomenon is a “deviation from [the] Weberian legal 
rational model of bureaucratic and democratic rule”9. It is a relationship between the 
state and the private sector10. The “grand corruption” that affects political parties is 
often as a result of party dominance and clientelism. This type of behaviour is 
                                            
8 Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert (1993) 'Corruption' The Quarterly Journal of Economics 
9 Andvig, Jens & Fjeldstad, Odd-Helge (2008) 'Crime Poverty and Police Corruption in Developing Countries' CMI 
Working papers 7 
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particularly observable in developing countries. Party corruption can be viewed in 
this context. It is the domination of elites11.  
A number of authors address corruption as resulting from the type or strength of the 
political system.  
There are those that regard corruption as resulting from the “democratic deficit” in 
developing societies 12 . The lack of checks and balances, accountability and 
transparent institutions allows for corrupt behaviour to take place. Understood in this 
way, corruption is a result of the lack of constraints upon it. It occurs because 
individuals are maximising their utility in a rational way, and benefitting from their 
position and the lack of constraint on such behaviour. 
Others regard corruption as occurring due to the lack of ethical leadership and poor 
governance emphasising “ethical leadership” 13. This take on corruption is not just 
about individual activity. Whilst it can be useful to explain it using rational choice and 
utility maximising theories, these theories emphasise the role of the individual within 
a broader culture of corruption determined by political leaders.  In understanding the 
corruption of political parties one must understand the role that groups have to play. 
An important factor in this is the role that leaders can play. “Ethical leadership” can 
be an effective constraint on individual behaviour.  
There is a myriad of economic literature and works that focus on corruption as a 
rational choice. Susan Rose-Ackerman, formally of the World Bank follows this 
model, as do Heywood, Mishira, Wick and Bicchieri & Duffy14. What these works 
emphasise are the incentives towards corruption. Using game theory each of these 
works presents us with a set of payoffs and models with which to analyse corruption. 
What is important to gather from these is that corruption is not a specific or unique 
phenomenon in Africa, nor is each individual case especially different. There are 
                                            
11 Fatton, Robert (1992) Predatory Rule: State and Civil Society in Africa Boulder, Co: Lynne Rienner 
12 Doig, Alan & Theobald Robin (2000) Corruption and Democratisation London: Frank Cass and Co. Ltd. 
13 Hope, K. (2000) Corruption and Development in Africa: Lessons from country case studies Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan 
14 Heywood, Paul (1997) ‘Political Corruption: Problems and Perspectives’ in Heywood (ed.) Political Corruption 
Oxford: Blackwell; Heywood, Paul (2006) 'Political Scandals and Corruption' in Heywood et al (eds.) 
Developments in European Politics London: Palgrave Macmillan; Mishra (2006) ‘Persistence of Corruption: Some 
Theoretical Perspectives’ World Development 34: 2 ; Bicchieri, Cristina & Duffy, John (1997) ‘Corruption Cycles’ in 
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trends and recurring characteristics that are present not just in Africa but throughout 
the world. The implication is that the problem of corruption in southern Africa is 
caused by the lack of constraints and institutions to prevent the behaviour, rather 
than being cultural or historical. That is not to say that other factors do not matter 
rather that they are not the primary cause. 
The consequences of corruption are both economic and political. The literature on 
the economic consequences focuses on its domestic and international effect on 
investment. Corruption leads to lower growth, yet the reaction to corruption is often 
worse that the ‘wrong doing’ itself15. That is that while there is a direct impact of 
corrupt behaviour to the firms and the individuals who are paying the bribe, the 
secondary consequences of investors being scared off are worse. Other economic 
impacts are the effect on productivity, inequality, and GDP growth16. 
 
1.7 Chapter Outline 
The dissertation proceeds as follows. Chapter 2 presents an introduction to political 
corruption, particularly systematic corruption and the effect on the behaviour of 
political parties. The chapter argues that corruption can occur as a result of the 
political system. Chapter 3 outlines the IFIs’ concern with corruption and highlights 
the limitations of their views. Acknowledging that the IFIs are limited by their 
mandates as to what they are able to achieve, the chapter argues that the WB and 
IMF anti-corruption and good governance initiatives are undermined by the focus on 
a state centric idea of corruption. Chapter 4 assesses whether or not the view of 
political corruption held by the World Bank and the IMF is effective in understanding 
political corruption in South Africa. The chapter demonstrates the importance of the 
political system as a cause of corruption. It also demonstrates that systems of 
governance can themselves be corrupt as well as being causes of corruption, where 
political competition and power are exercised in a corrupt manner. Chapter 6 
concludes that the IFIs’ definition, views, and focus, although legitim ate, legal, and 
                                            
15 Della Porta, Donatella & Vannucci Alberto (1997) ‘The perverse effects of political corruption’ Political Studies 
45 pp. 516-538 
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prudent, are potentially the road to ineffectiveness. In order to fully combat corruption 
at a systematic level they will need to broaden their mandates and involve 
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2: Systematic Political Corruption: The blurring of the party/ state 
divide 
 
This chapter identifies causes of corruption, highlighting the important disjuncture 
between the state and the political party. The chapter focuses on the role of political 
parties within the various systems of government. In the following chapters’ analysis 
of the IFIs’ anticorruption efforts, it shall be shown that the IFI’s understanding of 
political corruption stems from a state centric focus rather than a systemic one. The 
focus of this chapter is to answer the question: To what extent is political corruption a 
result of the political system? 
Corruption is often a result of the political system and in some cases replaces the 
political system. It is also a relationship between the public and private sphere, 
where the state represents the public sphere. However, it is more effective to 
analyse corruption as three separate relationships between firms, the state, and 
political parties. The nature of these relationships is determined by the political 
system. This chapter focuses on the corruption surrounding political parties. After 
defining corruption in a way that emphasises power as well as material relationships, 
the chapter proceeds to outline systematic corruption in political parties, before 
analysing what the roles of the party and the private sector are in relation to the 
electoral, bureaucratic and party systems.  
2.1: Political Corruption 
The essential characteristics of Joseph Nye’s seminal definition of corruption are: the 
abuse of public office for private gain and; that private gain includes benefits to 
others, such as the family, friends, and other parties, not just the individual17. At a 
political level this involves a process of “duplicitous exclusion”18. This process has 
three elements: 1) the unjustifiable exclusion of a group; 2) those that are excluded 
                                            
17  “Corruption is behaviour which deviates from the formal duties of a public role because of private regarding 
(personal, close family, private clique) pecuniary or status gains; or violates rules against the exercise of certain 
types of private regarding influence. This includes such behaviour as bribery (use of a reward to pervert the 
judgment of a person in a position of trust); nepotism (bestowal of patronage by reason of ascriptive relationship 
rather than merit); and misappropriation (illegal appropriation of public resources for private regarding uses).”Nye, 
Joseph (1967) ‘Corruption and Political Development: a cost benefit analysis’ American Political Science Review 
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have a claim to inclusion that is both recognised and violated by the corrupt; and 3) 
inclusion benefits those included to the detriment of those excluded19. Corruption is 
not simply a relationship between those involved, but also has a detrimental political 
effect on those that are excluded.  
The definition used in this dissertation is not without limitations or criticisms. It 
arguably does not fully appreciate political institutions within democracies20, or the 
multiple organisations and institutions that make up the ‘body politik’. It also focuses 
on corruption as an administrative problem, with “political” referring to “state”, and 
“state” referring to “administrative”21.  
It is also not the only recognised definition of corruption. The public interest definition 
of corruption conceptualises corruption around the fact that it is against the public 
interest22. This requires empirical evidence of the cost and benefits of any given 
action in order to determine whether it is corrupt. The public opinion definition where 
an act is corrupt if public opinion determines it to be so is subjective and often driven 
by the media23. 
Acknowledging the limitations and alternatives, the public office definition is used in 
this dissertation because of its simplicity, inclusiveness, and its parsimony.  
Over time, different societies have had different understandings of how politics is 
conducted and what constitutes legitimate influence24. One of the debates in the 
literature surrounding the problem of bribery is the difference between offering a 
bribe and the practice of gift giving. The supposed difference lies in the social 
acceptability of the two practices: bribery is the use of reward to pervert the judgment 
of a person in a position of trust25, whereas, gift giving can be perfectly acceptable 
and integrated within African or Asian customs26. In fact not offering a gift can be just 
as shocking in some societies as accepting favours or bribes in others27. So whilst it 
                                            
19 Ibid 
20 Warren, Mark (2006) 'Corruption as Duplicitious Exclusion' Political Science and Politics 39:4, pp. 803-807 
21 Ibid 
22  Leys, Colin (1999) 'What is the Problem About Corruption' in Heidenheimer (ed.) Political Corruption: A 
Handbook New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers 
23 Philps (1997) at 23 
24 Ibid 
25 Nye (1967) at 420  
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is unacceptable in some societies to offer some form of payment in exchange for 
favours, in some societies it is de rigueur. However, when too much credence is 
given to local norms and customs there is a danger of “[embracing] a conceptual 
relativism which renders any cross cultural analysis of corruption incoherent”28. This 
is one of the major difficulties in constructing an understanding of corruption to be 
used comparatively. 
However, irrespective of the cultural attitudes towards gift giving, the practice of 
bribery is often perceived as being morally wrong or bad. 
This assertion that corruption is bad is not necessarily correct. The use of bribes to 
avoid excessive regulation and bureaucracy can assist in ‘greasing the wheels’ of 
business although where there is excessive regulation it incentivises predation as 
the payment of bribes merely encourages further predation. This will discourage 
investment and distort market allocation. If on the other hand the excessive level of 
regulation is simply an extension of an authoritarian state, then the payment of 
bribes to avoid such regulation may in fact increase investment. 
2.1.1 Power and corruption 
The public sector comprises of state owned institutions which are controlled by the 
executive, and the private sector comprises of institutions and firms which are 
privately owned. Corruption occurs where these spheres interact.29 It is motivated 
both by material gain, usually in the form of monetary benefit, and by the capture of 
power, or more specifically the ability to change public policy, from the state.  
Political parties are one such entity that benefits from gaining access to power 
through, for example, the politicisation of state functions such as the bureaucracy or 
security and intelligence services. Political parties are also motivated by the desire to 
maintain power, not just the capturing of rents. Political parties need a support base 
in the private sector, and most importantly they need a financial support base, in 
order to obtain funding. Political corruption is not just motivated by the desire to 
capture rents, but also the desire either to stay in power or to win power. Once 
                                            
28 Philps (1999) 
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again, this type of corruption can not be defined by the fact that it is necessarily bad. 
Such corruption may provide a platform for stability in a transitional state. 
The nature and type of corruption that occurs derives from the nature of the 
relationship between the state and the private sector, and the relative bargaining 
power of these actors to control the market for corruption30.  
Corruption is not just a relationship of material gain, it is also a relationship of power. 
These relationships between firms and political parties, and parties and the state are 
not determined by the relative balance of power, rather by the political system. The 
nature of the relationship is certainly important in determining the type of corruption 
and the extent of it. Yet the relationship itself is determined by the regulatory and 
legislative environment.  
2.2: Political systems and methods of government. 
This section introduces political systems and government, and explains systematic 
corruption. In so doing the section builds on the understanding of corruption as a 
relationship of power, influence and private gain and demonstrates the systematic 
causes of corruption, and the corruption of political systems. The systems of concern 
are: the party system; the electoral system; and the bureaucratic system. 
This thesis is concerned with political structures and systems, and the corrupting of 
those structures and systems. Corrupt political systems can be categorised in two 
ways. The corruption can be systemic or state centric. State centric corruption refers 
to the state and its institutions of government; political structures and systems that 
constitute that state, and the corrupting of those structures and systems. This is in 
contrast to systemic corruption, which refers to widespread corruption throughout the 
system, including the political system, society and business.   
Systematic corrupt corruption is regular, and deliberate. Firstly the system itself can 
be a corrupt system of government. This means that the entire foundation of the 
system of government is based on corruption. An example of this is South Africa 
under Apartheid where the government operated entirely through a system of 
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duplicitous exclusion and favouritism. The second form of systematic corruption 
occurs when the political system causes or leads to corrupt behaviour.  
The focus of this dissertation is both systemic and state centric systematic corruption 
and the systems of government which lead to corruption, such as dominant party 
systems, and political appointee bureaucracies.  
Political systems are the structures that determine actions relevant to the making of 
political decisions31. In contrast to a political process, a system includes a totality of 
relevant units and a stability and structure to the interaction of those units.  
The units of the political system are the actors: Their role being “the organized sector 
of an actor’s orientation which constitutes and defines his [or her] participation in an 
interactive process”32. 
Examples of such systems are democracy, oligarchy, dictatorship and so on. In each 
system the role ‘who governs’ is defined. The way in which the government operates 
is determined by the system, restricting the actions of the individual roles. In each 
system the relationship between the state and the people is different. This 
dissertation is concerned with corruption within democratic systems of government. 
Democracy is the rule by a government chosen by the people through an election. 
There are multiple types of democracy, with variance in the party system, election 
process, and government structure. 
Within a democratic system of governance there are three important sub systems. 
These are the party system, the electoral system and the bureaucracy.  The nature 
of the party system is determined by the number and strength of political parties. 
This is linked to the electoral system. ‘First Past the Post’ systems tend to lead to 
two parties competing, whereas PR systems tend to lead to multiple parties. The 
final system is that of the bureaucracy: the civil service. There are international 
differences in the way in which civil servants are appointed, the amount they are 
paid, their role, and the capabilities of personnel.  
One of the main actors in democratic political systems is the political party. 
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2.3: Political Parties 
Political parties play a key function in representative democracies. Sartori’s 
minimalist definition of a political party is: “Any political group that presents at 
elections, and is capable of placing through elections, candidates for public office”33. 
They are responsible for opinion formation, the mobilisation of the electorate, the 
selection of candidates for office and the organisation of election campaigns and the 
party, around common interests34.  
There are three important dimensions to corruption within a party as opposed to the 
state. Firstly, political entities need not be in office in order to exploit that office35. 
Parties are able to benefit from the potential of power as well as state authority itself. 
However parties can also trade on their potential for power and their role in the 
legislative decision making, even when they are not in office. Secondly, when 
funding is directed at parties and used for party purposes, the private gain is in the 
form of a ‘club good’. Thirdly, political corruption does not necessarily involve money 
changing hands. It often takes the form of trading in influence. Thus political 
corruption may, in many circumstances, be legal. The use of legal means to deliver 
favours may include the rewriting of bills or the “exclusion of certain sectors from the 
scope of a bill”36. It may also involve the abuse of state power by the party to fill the 
bureaucracy with party cadres.  These three dimensions to political party corruption 
are very important. The phenomena cannot simply be understood as an illegal 
monetary based relationship. 
2.3.1 Party Financing 
In order to complete the functions of opinion formation, mobilisation, and 
organisation, parties need funds. Party finances pay for the posters, brochures, 
leaflets, TV and radio adverts, travel, and other expenses involved in winning an 
                                            
33  Sartori, Giovanni (1976)  Parties and Party Systems: A Framework for Analysis Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press at 64 
34  Andrea Rommel. 2003. Political Parties, party communication and new information and communication 
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election. Money “buys the access, favours, skills, goods, and services that are 
essential to party activity”37. Without funding parties simply cannot operate. 
The way in which parties are funded can be divided into the three categories. Parties 
can rely upon internal financing. The purest form of internal financing is individual 
ownership, where a political party is owned by an individual or organisation. One 
example of this type of funding was Forza Italia, Burlesconi’s political party38. Other 
forms of internal financing come from income from investments, contributions and 
fees from members, and the sale of party publications.  
Another category is external financing. In these cases the party is financed through 
donations. In some instances political parties receive donations from the Trades 
Unions. This is typical in European systems such as the UK where the Labour party 
is in part funded by the Trades Unions. External finance can also come from private 
donations. This opens up the possibility for corruption. Where parties are funded by 
an individual outside the party, the level of donation may depend on the willingness 
of the party to represent the interests of the donor rather than broader membership 
or electorate. Or as Williams puts it “He who pays the piper calls the tune” 39 . 
Examples of countries where this type of financing predominate are Japan and 
Korea. In these countries political parties have long established ties with businesses. 
The final type of funding is that which comes from the state. In some countries 
political parties receive funding from the state as a way of preventing the opportunity 
for selling influence. This is the case in Germany. One of the problems of this is that 
those in power then have control of funding for their own party. Or, again, as 
Williams puts it, it would be like “giving an alcoholic the keys to the bottle store”40. 
Parties need finances in order to fulfil their role however this also presents the 
opportunity for corruption.  
                                            
37 Williams, Robert (2000) 'Aspects of Party Finance and Political Corruption' in Williams (ed.) Party Finance and 
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Corruption can, in part, be attributed to the growing costs of conducting politics41. 
Firstly, politics has become an ever more expensive business. Political parties, as 
the main link between the public and politics, have to front the costs of democratic 
campaigns, which are becoming more expensive over time 42 . Secondly, the 
increased availability of news, through the development of the 24 hour news network 
and the internet, means that parties are now on a constant election footing43. Given 
that elections are becoming more expensive anyway, the fact that parties are now 
effectively on permanent campaign, means that the costs of running a party are 
significantly increasing. Lastly, the traditional sources of revenue for political parties 
are drying up44. Party membership has fallen. With fewer people paying membership 
fees as well as the increase in cost there is an increased incentive for European 
political parties to turn to alternative means in order to generate revenue. 
As well as the cost of politics, corruption increases when there is a lack of 
institutional restraint preventing such behaviour45. Rather than assuming that corrupt 
behaviour occurs when there is an incentive for it, it occurs unless there is a strong 
incentive against it. This is an important distinction, and is one that is dependent 
upon the political system.  
Firstly, the “institutions… are typically at various stages of consolidation” 46 . For 
example, the democratic stakes in a developing country are generally higher than 
those in developed societies. Weak institutions create a level of politicisation within 
the functional elements of the state. With a non-neutral police force or judiciary, there 
is a “winner takes all” element to elections. This creates incentives for corruption. 
Secondly, parties in different systems operate in very different environments. The 
rules and regulations determining their behaviour are varied. There can be large 
difference in the number of parties, the relative strength of parties and their political 
capital, as well as different systems having different funding methods47.  
                                            
41 Heywood, Paul (2006) 'Political Scandals and Corruption' in Heywood et al (eds.) Developments in European 
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In systems where a political party is responsible for agenda setting and voting the 
levels of corruption will be higher. This is because parties need to raise higher levels 
of funding than individual legislators, and they prefer fungible funds. The voting 
behaviour of legislators is determined by the party rather than the individual. The 
individual voter has an obligation to ‘toe the party line’ as his or her political power is 
determined by the party. This has two effects on the incentives for corruption. Firstly, 
rather than buying the influence of an individual, the briber is able to use the party 
framework in order to block purchase votes on any given issue. Secondly, there is an 
incentive against whistle blowing from within the party. Members of the party are 
incentivised not to disclose any information on corrupt behaviour as they themselves 
are dependent upon the party for their position. So, the strength of the party has an 
adverse effect on the level of corruption. The identity of the political player targeted 
by business interest groups in the legislature is a significant determinant of the level 
of corruption. It is the institutions themselves that determine who this target will be48. 
More specifically, countries with legislative rules that create party focused lobbying 
will experience higher levels of corruption than those where lobbying by business 
interests is focussed on individuals. In other words, not only are political parties an 
important actor in corrupt behaviour, they also increase the level of such behaviour. 
The need for party funding certainly leads to corruption through the trading of 
influence. Examples of this type of behaviour include: selling ‘face time’ with 
ministers, officials, and party members. Influence trading may take place over many 
years and be a far more complicated relationship than a simple form of corruption 
such as bribery. Key argued that “much of what we consider corruption is simply the 
un-institutionalised influence of wealth in a political system”49. This certainly has 
some value as in most political orders, wealth occupies an uneasy position50. Those 
who control the wealth in a society have a form of leveraged influence over the 
governing institutions. The way in which this manifests itself depends on the nature 
of the system. 
                                            
48 Yadav (2011) Political Parties, Business Groups, and Corruption in Developing Countries New York: Oxford 
University Press 
49 Key (1936) The Techniques of Political Graft in the United States p407 
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2.3.2 Liberation Movements 
There are a number of political parties that started out as liberation movements. In 
southern Africa alone the ANC, Zanu-PF, and SWAPO have dominated politics since 
each fought for independence in South Africa, Zimbabwe, and Namibia respectively. 
There are a number of characteristics that distinguish liberation movements from 
political parties. The case of the ANC demonstrates that these distinguishing 
characteristics can either cause or enable corruption. 
Firstly, the organisation of the movement is distinct from political parties. The 
relationships between those within a liberation movement and those in a political 
party are different. Successful liberation movements tend to have highly centralised 
power and developed hierarchies. These are needed to maintain the pressure and 
organisation during the liberation struggle. The interpersonal relationships within a 
movement are also stronger than within a party. Actions that appear to be corrupt in 
political parties may be viewed by the movement as simply former comrades helping 
each other out. 
By definition these movements were focussed on a single issue: that of liberation. 
The economic and social policies of liberation movements were often simply those 
they adopted from whoever was funding them. The adoption of Marxist or Maoist 
economic rhetoric by a number of African liberation movements was in part simply 
due to the fact that they were being funded by the USSR or China during the Cold 
War. The main aim of the movement was to obtain power through non democratic 
means. This means that once in power, these movements often have a pragmatic 
attitude towards policy. 
Another feature of these movements is that, again by definition, those in the 
movement had no experience of government. This means that those who did not 
have the appropriate skill level to be in a position of authority had access to public 
office. It also meant that those in power were unfamiliar with the practical working of 
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As a final characteristic of Liberation Movements, Melber points to the issue of the 
‘Third Term Movement’ 51 . This refers to the fact that many incoming liberation 
leaders were constitutionally bound to only serving two terms. Many attempted to 
change this, with varying degrees of success. The justification for such a move was 
often that the only chance to maintain stability within the country was for the 
incumbent president to stay in office. However, this change necessitates the 
undermining of democracy. In some cases, such as Zimbabwe, the will of the leader 
to maintain power has led to corruption and the development of clientelistic 
networks.  
In the case study presented in this dissertation, that of the ANC in South Africa, 
some of the characteristics of the party are derived from its history as a liberation 
movement and this has in impact on the level of corruption. Very tight personal 
relationships, and the limited policy experience of the early years of government, 
were important elements in creating an environment for corruption. 
2.4: Dominant Parties: Party and Electoral Systems 
Dominant parties are parties or political organisations that have successively won 
election victories and whose future defeat cannot be envisaged or is unlikely in the 
near future52. They establish electoral dominance for an uninterrupted and prolonged 
period; enjoy dominance in the formation and running of governments; and 
consequently shape and dominate the public agenda, notably with regard to pursuit 
of ‘historical project’53.  
The connection between party competition and state exploitation has long been 
recognised in the literature54. The behaviour of politicians is moderated by the threat 
of being voted out at the next election. Elections hold parties to account, however in 
the case of a dominant party where the likelihood of being voted out is very low then 
the constraints are not binding. In theory incumbent parties are held to account by 
the opposition, although political competition in South Africa is racially charged and 
                                            
51 Melber, H. (2003) 'From liberation movements to governments: on political culture in Southern Africa' African 
sociological Review 6: 1 pp. 161-172 
52 Suttner, R. (2006) ‘Party Dominance ‘Theory’: Of what value?’ Politikon Vol 33: 3 
53 Pemple (1990) Uncommon democracies: The one-party dominant regimes Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press 
54  Kopecky, Petr (2011) 'Political Competition and Party Patronage: Public Appointments in Ghana and South 
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accusations of corruption from the opposition are often labelled as racist55.  Finally, 
Grzymala-Busse argues that political competition encourages those in power to 
develop institutions, rules, and regulations against corruption, to insure them against 
permanent exclusion when they find themselves in opposition. If the party is unable 
to envisage itself in opposition then the incentive for such insurance is very low.  
The theory of dominant parties suggests that because of the level of current and 
expected future influence the party has over the political system it is able to operate 
in a way that is not constrained. Because the party cannot foresee losing power then 
it does not function as though constrained by the threat of being voted out. This 
means that it is able to operate in a corrupt manner because the role of democracy 
in curbing corruption does not apply. 
The theory of dominant parties is contested. Some scholars, such as Reddy, argue 
that “dominant parties with legitimacy, having a strong democratic tradition and 
institutionalised mechanism for conflict management, contribute to the consolidation 
of democracy in deeply divided societies”. 56 Others however argue that as a theory it 
offers little explanatory power to the way in which politics is conducted in the “real 
world”57.  
Irrespective of this, in theory the lack of democratic constraints offers the opportunity 
for the ruling party to operate in a way that it would otherwise be unable to. The 
existence of a dominant party may give rise to increased corruption as the 
expectation of being voted out of office is very low. 
As well as the reduced democratic constraints dominant party systems encourage 
corruption through ‘trading influence’. In this case ‘trading influence’ means more 
than simply those in the public sphere employing their powers of office for private 
and self-serving ends in the selling and buying of public decisions58. It encapsulates 
relationships that are non-monetary, or where the benefit is accrued elsewhere. 
There are many reasons why this type of behaviour may take place, one of which is 
                                            
55  Shrire (2001) 'The Realities of Opposition in South Africa: Legitimacy, Strategies and Consequences' 
Democratization 8: 1, pp. 135-148 
56 Reddy (2005) The congress party model: South Africa’s African national congress and India’s Indian National 
Congress as dominant parties African and Asian studies Vol 4: No3 at 297.  
57 Suttner (2006) 
58  Offe, C. (2004) 'Controlling Political Corruption: Conceptual and Practical Issues' in Kornai, J. & Rose-
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the political exclusion of a minority which occurs under a dominant party. Scott 
argues that in these regimes, there are groups that gain preferential formal access to 
the political process to the detriment of groups with potential political resources who 
are disadvantaged in the formal process.  
This type of exclusion has led to corruption and the purchasing of influence in many 
post-independence regimes and dominant party systems. In a post-independence 
society there will be a number of groups with preferential access to the political 
process59. Scott identifies mass organisations and peasant movements, as well as 
minority and expatriate business groups and the military as groups that face potential 
exclusion60. 
Taking the example of minority and expatriate business groups: In a post-
independence society it is highly likely that there a number of wealthy elite who have 
lost political influence in the transition. These may be wealthy expatriates or 
members of other minority groups that have retained economic wealth in the post-
independence society. One way for those that are excluded from the political 
process to gain access to political capital is to buy it. Groups that have high 
economic wealth and yet low political capital have an incentive to use corruption as a 
means of obtaining influence61.  
Another aspect of party dominance is that, given the length of time in office, the role 
of the party and that of the state become merged. The distinction between party and 
state become blurred, giving the political party the ability to act as the state, given 
the level of access it has. Failure to distinguish between the party and state 
resources often leads to corruption. This was the case in Kenya under the leadership 
of Daniel Arap Moi. 
Parties that have this level of dominance, such as the ANC in South Africa or the 
INC in India, often have such high levels of support and legitimacy because of their 
role as liberation movements. 
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2.5 Patronage and Clientelism: The Political Party and the Bureaucratic 
System 
Clientelism is a “relationship of exchange between unequals”62. It is an exchange of 
both wealth and power. Furthermore it is the “analysis of how persons of unequal 
authority, yet linked through ties of interest and friendship, manipulate their 
relationships in order to attain their ends” 63 . As with all corrupt relationships, 
clientelism is an exchange of both wealth and power. A more focused definition may 
be that the study of clientelism is the “analysis of how persons of unequal authority, 
yet linked through ties of interest and friendship, manipulate their relationships in 
order to attain their ends” 64 .  Patronage is slightly different: Patronage is the 
bestowal of a position, whereas clientelism is the exchange of goods and services 
for political support. Patronage may be used as a way of building clientelistic 
networks, but the two are separate concepts. Both involve sharing influence through 
a network of existing relationship in order for each side to gain some form of benefit. 
These relationships tend to develop when entitlements are not protected by 
constitutional rights endorsed by the centre65.  
Clientelism as a form of corruption is based on a dyadic relationship between the 
patron and the client. Once again it is a relationship of exchange that is set by the 
political system and is exercised through the abuse of the powers of state. An 
individual of higher social status, or who has access to a higher level of state access 
(the patron), uses his own influences and resources to provide protection and or 
benefits to the actor of lower status or access (the client)66. The client reciprocates 
by offering support, assistance and personal services to the patron. Given that the 
client is dependent upon his or her patron, and there are likely to be many people 
willing to take up a clientelistic position whilst the number of potential patrons is 
limited, the relationship is likely to be controlled by the patron. 
                                            
62 Clapham, Christopher (1982) Private Patronage and Public Power: Political Clientelism in the Modern State 
London: Pinter 
63 Weingrod in Ibid.  
64 Weingrod Cited in Ibid. 
65  Rosetti, C. (1994) ‘Constitutionalism and Clientelism in Italy’, in L. Roniger and A. Günes-Ayata (eds) 
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Clientelism is often associated with the particularistic use of public resources in the 
electoral arena67 . This implies a much broader client base. Rather than dyadic 
relationships between two individuals on a personal level a patron may be able to 
distribute benefits to a whole group within a society in return for political support. 
This also implies that rather than a single patron, the role may be filled by a group of 
individuals. In fact a political party may be able to obtain the support of an entire 
group within the society simply by having the potential to distribute resources either 
in the present or in the future. Often this is done through ‘Kingmakers’68. Individuals 
who have influence over a groups voting behaviour are targeted with offers of money 
or position in return for the groups’ votes69. 
A form of patronage is the deployment of party cadres into state positions. These 
relationships corrode the distinction between the party and the state as often the 
benefit to the client is a position within the bureaucracy or another arm of the state. 
This was the case in the USA in the 19th century where the system of government 
allowed political parties taking office to reward those faithful to the party with 
appointments in the federal bureaucracy. The ‘spoils system’ as it was known, 
derived its name from the now famous phrase “to the victor belong the spoils of the 
enemy”: said by a Senator of New York following Jackson’s presidential win in 
182870. The aversion to the system in the USA was based on the undermining of 
meritocracy and led to the bureaucratic reform movement in the USA in the 1880’s.  
Many countries in the developing world, especially those who have followed a 
developmental state model, have political and bureaucratic systems that are 
effectively ‘spoils systems’ where bureaucratic appointments are based upon 
patronage. 
This is largely seen by the west as being corrupt and counterproductive to 
development. However, this assertion is based on the assumption that if the 
bureaucracy were not filled with party cadres it would be filled with an unbiased 
meritocracy, and in many places this is simply not the case. Where political 
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allegiance is based on ethnicity, and the level of politicisation is very high, by not 
having people loyal to one’s own party in the bureaucracy, it is argued that the result 
would be to appoint those loyal to the opposition. The functions of the state are 
inseparable from party politics because politicisation of the population is very high. In 
these cases the operational ability of the government would be limited. In cases 
where there is a need for rapid development, appointing bureaucratic positions on a 
patronage basis is seen as a good thing. This allows development to occur much 
faster albeit to the detriment of the separation of party and state powers. 
An example of this is the ‘enveloppes’ system used by President Joseph Kabila in 
the DRC. By offering low salaries and instead rewarding loyalists with payments of 
cash the leader is able to buy loyalty71. In this case patronage provides stability in a 
system where multiple state functionaries have entrenched political and economic 
interests72.  
Networks of patron-client relationships within a ruling party exemplify the corrosion of 
the separation of the political party and the state apparatus. The positions of the 
state become filled with party cadres so that they operate as part of the party, rather 
than being independent state functionaries. The party in power gains access to all of 
the functions of the state, rather than just those reserved for political power, such as 
the executive. 
2.6 Systematic political corruption: Conclusions 
This chapter answers the question: To what extent is corruption systematic? The 
chapter demonstrates that corruption is more than just a relationship between 
political parties and private firms. It is more than just the abuse of state power. It is a 
result of the political system, and in some cases, replaces the political system.  
Political corruption refers to the ability of the private sector to shape the “rules of the 
game”73.  According to the common definition corruption results in private gain, 
however, “...’private’ often refers to large groups such as political parties”74.   
                                            
71 Stearns,  Jason. (2011) ‘Dancing in the Glory of Monsters’ at 324 
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A political party is: “Any political group that presents at elections, and is capable of 
placing through elections, candidates for public office”75. The political party is able to 
gain access to the institutions of state, and then corrupt them from the inside, selling 
on this access to the private sector. 
In order to operate, parties need funds. The need for funding creates the incentive 
for the party to engage in corruption. However the nature of this relationship is 
system specific.  The way in which corruption occurs depends on the relative power 
of the actors involved. It is also a function of the system, for example Apartheid 
South Africa was a political system that was entirely based on corruption. In other 
cases it is the system that leads to corruption. In new democracies the strength of 
institutions dictates the ability of politicians to abuse these institutions. In some 
developmental states corruption of institutions may be preferable for development.  
The relationship that the party maintains with is donors and funders is determined 
legally and is structural. However, parties may attract funds in a corrupt manner that 
is in fact entirely legal. In such cases corruption can be classified as systematic, as 
the political system is dependent upon corruption. An example of this is discussed in 
relation to the ANC and Chancellor House in chapter four.  
Furthermore systematic corruption occurs when a political party starts to exert its 
influence over supposedly neutral arms of the state. This includes the politicisation of 
the bureaucracy, the security and police forces, and the judiciary. This is a corruption 
of the political system. It is also a result of the system, as often and as has been 
highlighted in this chapter, the ability of the political party to engage in such 
behaviour is a result of the party and electoral systems. This is especially true in 
cases where there is a single dominant party. 
This chapter develops an understanding of corruption as a systematic political 
phenomenon. The following chapter demonstrates that the understanding of political 
corruption that is held by the IFIs does not fully engage with corruption of this kind. 
The IFIs have state-centric mandates and to act otherwise is to risk political fallout. 
Their views and perspectives, although legitimate, legal and prudent, are likely to 
prove ineffective at combatting systematic political corruption. To do so would 
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involve a heavy engagement with domestic political systems this is beyond the remit 
and appetite of the IFIs. For general policy purposes the IFIs’ view of corruption is 
too narrow and limited as it overlooks the systematic nature of some corruption, as 
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3: The IFIs on political corruption: A state centric view 
 
Fighting corruption has become a policy priority for the development community76. 
The IFIs maintain that ineffective states retard and misdirect economic growth, 
therefore anti-corruption and good governance need to be addressed by those 
institutions that promote growth and development 77 . The problem is that the 
conceptualisation of corruption as a characteristic of a failed state overlooks the idea 
of corruption as a consequence of a political system. 
This chapter asks; how do the IFIs conceptualise corruption and what does such a 
conceptualisation overlook? Since the IFIs do not have a common corruption 
definition or understanding, this chapter produces a general outline of their 
approaches highlighting commonalities as well as common oversights.  The common 
feature of the IFIs’ approach to corruption is that they focus on corruption as a state 
centric phenomenon. 
To demonstrate this, this chapter argues that the IFIs’ interest in corruption 
originates from the practical need to combat corruption in their own programmes. 
Following this, the IFIs identified corruption as being one of the main barriers to and 
development started promoting anti-corruption and good governance initiatives. 
Because the purpose of the institutions is monetary and state centric, so are their 
views on corruption. These views overlook the importance of systematic political 
corruption. As such, their policies will be ineffective in tackling political corruption.  
The chapter concludes that the definitions, views, policies and prescriptions of the 
IFIs’ focus on corruption as a state centric concept, and in so doing overlook many of 
the systematic aspects of it that were demonstrated in chapter two.  
3.1 The pragmatic need for an anti-corruption policy 
The anticorruption and good governance policies of the IFIs originate from a 
pragmatic need of the organisations to tackle corruption. This need is driven by the 
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desire to combat corruption within state institutions in order to ensure that loans are 
used correctly. Subsequently their views on corruption are state centric. Both of the 
IFIs regard corruption as a characteristic of the state, rather than the political system. 
The Bank’s primary objective is development, with the official goal of poverty 
reduction 78 . This is achieved through the promotion of foreign investment, 
international trade, and capital investment. In contrast to the IMF, whose primary 
objective is international financial stability, the WB is concerned with development 
from within a country, at the micro level. It is simultaneously an organ of international 
development and a bank whose capital comes from the contribution of member 
states79. The bank issues around $20 billion in loans each year, a figure roughly 25% 
greater than USAID80. These loans are used for; investing in goods and services to 
promote development and; investing in political and institutional reforms. 
The original purpose of the bank was to be part of the effort to reconstruct Europe 
after WWII. However, over the last 40 years the purview of the bank has shifted, and 
the focus is now on developing countries and global economic development efforts. 
The shift of focus brought about a change in the problems that the bank had to deal 
with. However despite this changing purview, the primary focus has remained the 
promotion of development through issuing loans to capital projects at the domestic 
level. The anti-corruption and good governance efforts of the WB are an example of 
this change. 
The WB published a series of reports on SSA in the 1980’s proposing the need for 
corruption to be on the development agenda81. However, the main strategy of the 
WB during the 1980s was the implementation of the controversial Structural 
Adjustment Programmes and the ‘Washington Consensus’. One of the main 
criticisms of the both the SAPs and ‘Washington Consensus’, was the lack of 
                                            
78 The World Bank Group (henceforth World Bank) consists of 184 member states and is comprised of five 
organisations: i) the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD); ii) the International 
Development Association (IDA); iii) the international Finance Corporation (IFC); iv) the Multilateral Investment 
Guarantee Agency (MIGA); v) the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID).  Each 
of these organisations plays a different role within the WB structure; however they work together to reach the 
objectives of the bank. 
Munhoz, Carolina (2007) 'Corruption in the Eyes of the World Bank: Implications for the Institution's Policies and 
Developing Countries' Penn State International Law Review 26:3, pp. 691-708 
79 Ibid 
80 Mallaby, Sebastian (2005) 'Saving the World Bank' Foreign Affairs 84: 75 pp.75-86 
81 Mc Williams, J. Nolan (2007) 'Tug of War: The World Bank's new Governance and Anticorruption Efforts' 
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attention given to political institutions and in particularly governance, arguably the 
most glaring omission of the Consensus82. It was deemed that reform initiatives 
tackling governance problems were not necessary for development and therefore 
outside the Banks mandate. This was in part due to the Cold War environment 
where uncomfortable issues of state were overlooked to get countries signed up to 
the neoliberal agenda of the West83. The ‘taboo’84 was finally broken in 1996, when 
the then leader of the Bank, James Wolfensohn gave what was later dubbed the 
“Cancer of Corruption” speech, based on his experience in Indonesia, which put the 
issue at the forefront of the Bank’s concerns85.  
The primary need for the bank to acknowledge the detrimental effects of corruption is 
given by the Bank’s charter. IBRD Article III section 5 (b) states that loans granted by 
the bank are to be used for what they were intended, without regard for other political 
or non-economic considerations86. This means that the Bank has a role in making 
sure that funds are not lost in corruption in receiving countries. It has been estimated 
that $1 trillion is misspent due to corruption each year87. The bank has an obligation 
to its investors that these loans are used and disbursed for the purposes for which 
they were granted88. This obligation is restricted by IBRD article IV section 10 which 
requires the non-interference of the bank in political affairs89. Many people use this 
as justification for non-interference in systematic political affairs such as multiparty 
elections 90 . Whereas some argue that a broad interpretation of the charter is 
essential to serving the interests of its members91.  
                                            
82 Ibid 
83 Tanzi, Vito (1998) 'Corruption Around the World: Causes, Consequences, Scope, and Cures' IMF Staff Papers 
45: 4 
84 Brademas, J. & Heimann, F. (1998) 'Tackling International Corruption: No Longer taboo' Foreign Affairs 77: 5 
pp. 17-22 
85 Malaby, Sebastian (2004) The Worlds Banker: A Story of Failed States, Financial Crisis, and the Wealth and 
Poverty of Nations New York: Penguin Press 
86 IBRD articles of agreement Article III section 5 B 
87World Bank (2012) Six Questions on the Cost of Corruption with World Bank Institute Global Governance 
Director Daniel Kaufmann [Accessed on 18/06/2012] 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/NEWS/0,,contentMDK:20190295~menuPK:34457~pagePK:34370
~piPK:34424~theSitePK:4607,00.html 
88 McWilliams (2007) 
89 “The Bank and its officers shall not interfere in the political affairs of any member; nor shall they be influenced 
in their decisions by the political character of the member or members concerned. Only economic considerations 
shall be relevant to their decisions, and these considerations shall be weighed impartially in order to achieve the 
purposes [of the Bank]…” IRBD Article of Agreement IV section 10. 
90  Kaufmann, Daniel (2005) ‘Back to Basics: 10 Myths about Governance and Corruption’ Finance and 
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Whereas the Bank is primarily concerned with development and the eradication of 
poverty by investing in projects within countries, the IMF was created for the purpose 
of maintaining exchange rates for international free trade92. The adoption of free 
floating exchange rates following the abolition of the gold standard in the 1970’s the 
fund became the international lender of last resort. This role is achieved through the 
provision of funds to those in need designed to prevent the ‘beggar thy neighbour’ 
trade policies, and competitive currency devaluations resulting from face balance of 
payment shortfalls and financial crises. 
Having a ‘lender of last resort’ introduces a moral hazard into the international 
financial system93. Shortfalls in currency may naturally arise from normal trading, 
however they may also arise from poor policies undertaken by governments in the 
knowledge that the fund shall bail them out. In order to curb this, the Fund requires 
countries to adhere to certain conditions when it accepts a loan. It is these conditions 
that enable the IMF to have some influence over recipient governments as these are 
monitored. 
The need for the IMF to address corruption derives from their recognition that 
“corruption undermines the public’s trust in its government. It also threatens market 
integrity, distorts competition, and endangers economic development” 94 . Having 
identified corruption as a problem the IMF adopted a policy on how to address 
governance issues and corruption in a guidance note entitled The Role of the IMF in 
Governance Issues95. 
The guidance note states that the primary functions of the IMF were still to address 
macroeconomic imbalances and inflation, as well as to promote trade and exchange 
rate stability96. However, the guidance note also acknowledged that “the IMF has 
found that a much broader range of institutional reforms is needed if countries are to 
establish and maintain private sector confidence and thereby lay the basis for 
                                            
92 Vreeland, James (2003) The IMF and Economic Development Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
93 Moral hazard is defined as excessive expenditure due to eligibility for insurance benefits. 
 Marshall, J. (1976) Moral Hazard The American Economic Review Vol6 6:5 at 880 
94  IMF (2012) IMF Factsheet: The IMF and Good Governance [Accessed on 18/06/2012] 
www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts.htm 
95 Ibid 
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sustained growth”97. The emphasis however is on corruption within the state, rather 
than as a product of the system. It is aimed at curtailing the behaviour of those within 
the state, rather than address systematic causes of corruption.  
Whilst it is able to impose conditionality on loans and monitor policy, the fund has 
neither the mandate nor the resources to allow it to adopt the role of an “investigative 
agency” or “guardian of financial integrity”98. Having said this, the fund now has a 
policy that denies financial assistance to countries where bribery and corruption 
threaten to undermine economic recovery programmes.  
The IFIs are responsible for the interpretation of their own charters and determining 
their function. The current attitude towards anti-corruption and good governance is a 
pragmatic response to combatting one of the major barriers to development. 
However their response is characterised by the types of corruption they have direct 
contact with or have the ability to monitor through, for example, the IMF ‘Article IV 
Consultations’. 
The IFIs are state centric institutions and therefore have a state centric response to 
corruption, focussing on corruption within their own programmes and state finances. 
However, in understanding corruption in this way, cases of systematic political 
corruption are overlooked.  
3.2: The IFI’s views on corruption 
3.2.1 Definition 
The most common definition of corruption used by the IFIs is very broad and 
economic focussed: “A general definition of corruption is the use of public office for 
private gain”99. Acknowledging that it is hard to form agreement around a precise 
definition of corruption that is fully satisfactory and comprehensive, a working 
definition is often that “you know it when you see it”100.  
                                            
97 Ibid 
98 Ibid 
99 The definition is widely used throughout the WB literature. Eg. Kaufmann, Daniel (2006) 'Myths and Reality of 
Governance and Corruption' in The World Economic Forum Global Competitiveness Report 2005-2006 
Washington: World Bank pp81-98.  
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The IFIs are able define corruption to suit their purposes. They are not an academic 
institution, rather practical organisations. The state centric view of corruption is 
derived from the fact that the IFIs are themselves state centric institutions. The 
nature of the type of corruption that the IFIs are most likely to come into contact with, 
regarding the issuing of loans, requires an economic understanding of the 
concept101. The WB is concerned predominantly with the micro level, whereas the 
IMF is concerned with the international macro level. 
Market orientated definitions of corruption are a way of understanding corruption not 
a way of defining it102. These definitions are contingent on the existence of a system 
where there is a regulating principle103. In other words corruption is defined, not as 
an act which is income maximising, rather it is income maximising within the 
constraints of the context in which it occurs. This is determined by the political 
system and the role of political organisations. There must exist a prior understanding 
of public office and the expectation of adherence to principles by which the office is 
defined.  
The issue arises that a broad economic definition of corruption overlooks an 
inherently political aspect of corruption in that it often works through the functions of 
political parties and other political organisations. A market perspective analyses the 
incentives for corruption, rather than the systematic characteristics that create the 
incentives. The causes, characteristics and consequences of corruption identified by 
the IFIs lead to policy prescriptions that do not take into account the systematic 
dynamic of political corruption. 
3.2.2 Operationalization of definition: The state centric approach 
The key aspect in the IFIs’ anticorruption framework is the role of the state. This is 
useful because it focusses on corruption being an abuse of public office. What it 
does not do is go further than looking at the state, and the public offices of the state, 
as being a single entity. There is no understanding of corruption as being inherent in 
political systems, imbedded in parties and other organisations that perform the 
functions of the state. 
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Corruption at the state level is a result of the level of government constraints and 
benefits104. Constraints on the government come from legislation, and the level of 
accountability. Accountability of government is a function of the main pillars of 
democracy; democratic competition, the rule of law, and the freedom of the press. As 
well as constraint, corruption at the state level is dependent upon the benefits of 
corruption. These are largely financial, however the bank also identifies that “political 
networks dominate important private assets”105. 
The causes of corruption are always contextual. In different countries the nature of 
corruption is different. The WB identifies that “Incentives for corrupt behaviour arise 
whenever corrupt officials have wide discretion and little accountability” 106 . This 
assumes a game theoretic conceptualisation of corruption as a relationship involving 
relative payoffs. Both sides benefit. The question that arises is: How does this 
relationship come about? 
(a) The Policy Environment, resulting from a governance system failure in the 
state ability to control corruption leading to weak institutions.  
(b) Crime and punishment: Corruption occurs when the probability of getting 
caught and the ensuing punishment are lower than the benefits accrued107.  
This concentrates on two systems: governance and criminal. The approach taken by 
the IFIs is that corruption occurs as a result of a failure of these systems, rather than 
being a part of the system itself.  
A seminal research paper of the IMF presents a number of factors that directly 
contribute to corruption, including regulations, poorly administered tax systems and 
the provision of public goods at below market prices through the bureaucratic 
system108. The paper also addresses political corruption in the form of control of 
spending decisions and other discretionary decisions109. The paper identifies the role 
                                            
104  Grey, Cheryl & Kaufmann, Daniel (1998) ‘Corruption and development’ Finance and Development 
Washington: IMF 
105 Kenny, Charles & Soreide, Tina (2008) 'Grand Corruption in Utilities' World Bank Policy Research Working 
Paper WPS4805 at 5 
106 World Bank (1997) World Bank Development Report: The State in a Changing World Washington: World Bank 
107 Ibid 
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of party funding in causing political corruption as pressure is put onto parties to 
generate funds. Thus “democracy is not necessarily a cure for corruption”110. 
The paper also presents a number of indirect causes of corruption: Situations which 
allow for corrupt behaviour to take place. One such indirect cause is the example set 
by political leadership. The argument here is that when top leaders either take part in 
or condone corruption then an example is set for those functioning in the lower levels 
of the administration111. 
Anti-Corruption strategies thus focus on good governance. The bank admits that 
there is “no unique path to good governance” however governance strategies focus 
on the role of the state rather than the role of parties. The prescription for this abuse 
of state power is seen as being the promotion of good governance. This 
encapsulates a conceptualisation of corruption being inherent in the relationship 
between the public and private sector. The particular aspect of this relationship that 
is targeted is the relationship between the state and those over which it governs. 
This overlooks the importance of domestic politics in the formation and creation of 
the role of the state. 
One issue in the field of governance is the imperfect understanding of how politics 
shape governance112. With multiple possible factors and international variance in 
cases, an overall framework identifying what matters most is almost impossible to 
create. This has led to a blanket treatment of politics as being an “obstacle” to good 
governance113. This fails to address a number of questions relating to the strength 
and competitiveness of institutions, especially the parliament: most importantly the 
role of undue elite influence and clientelism114. These are long term relationships that 
often depend on the party system. 
A large amount of the IFIs’ understanding and policy prescription is based upon 
empirical data. The research focuses on measuring the effects of corruption. In 
particular, the IMF focusses on the effects of corruption on macroeconomic 
                                            
110 Ibid 
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112  Kaufmann, Daniel (2003) Rethinking Governance: Empirical Lessons Challenge Orthodoxy Washington: 
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indicators and the WB focusses on the effects at the micro level.  This means that 
the types of corruption that are easier to measure become the focus of anticorruption 
policy, whereas those forms of corruption that are more covert tend to be 
overlooked. The emphasis is driven by the availability of data. It is also driven by the 
assertion that “Chaotic corruption is worse than organised [political] corruption”115. 
This must be in part due to the ease of ability in measuring this type as opposed to 
trying to measure the level of political corruption.  
The types of corruption that are most measureable are those that involve large 
numbers of both those giving and those receiving bribes. This occurs within the 
bureaucratic structures of the state, rather than at the top levels of political office. 
Knack identifies a number of caveats in using such measures116. Foremost is that 
enterprise surveys such as the BEEPS 117  only measure corrupt transactions 
between business firms and public officials. This focusses on the payment of bribes 
in areas such as tax collection and business licencing. Firms have an incentive to 
take part in these surveys, and to answer truthfully in them. The assumption is that 
greater knowledge of the level of corruption within a country will lead to pressure to 
combat such corruption. However, what is not covered is state capture at the highest 
levels. Where private firms are benefiting from inclusive access and influence at the 
top level they are less likely to provide accurate data for corruption measures. This 
makes top level corruption hard to measure. 
Attempts at measuring corruption at the highest levels are based on perceptions. 
This also presents difficulties. Firstly, a survey of perceptions on corruption requires 
that those participating in the survey have a common understanding of what different 
aspects of corruption constitute. Secondly some forms of corruption revolve around 
the idea of duplicitous exclusion118. In these cases those that are excluded will not 
have an accurate understanding of the extent of corruption, and those that are 
included will not be forthcoming with information. 
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The result of focusing on a state centric economic concept of corruption, and of 
emphasising measurability, is that corruption is seen by the IFIs as being inherently 
“bad”. This is supported empirically: an improvement in a country’s corruption index 
from 6 to 8 (where 0 is the least corrupt and 10 the most) will experience a 4% 
increase in its investment rate and a 0.5% increase in its annual GDP119.  
IMF research finds the following empirical effects: 
 Corruption reduces investment, and therefore has a negative impact on 
growth120.  
 It reduces expenditure on education and health121.  
 It increases public investment because public investment projects lend 
themselves easily to manipulations by high level officials to extract bribes122. 
However, it reduces the effectiveness of this expenditure as the money goes 
towards “white elephant” projects, and projects are completed to low 
standards123. 
 It reduces tax revenue because of the impact that bureaucratic corruption has 
on tax administration124. 
 Corruption reduces the level of FDI as it has the same effect as a tax. Wei 
shows that where corruption has a high variance it has a greater negative 
effect125.  
Corruption reduces investment and growth by increasing both costs and uncertainty. 
This is because corruption increases the required return on investment. An 
investment of a nominal amount of money into a project where there is no corruption 
will receive a higher yield than the same nominal investment into a corrupt project. 
This is because all of the investment in the non-corrupt project is ‘value adding’; a 
return is made on the entire nominal amount because it is all invested. In a corrupt 
                                            
119 Mauro 1998 Based on CPI measures of corruption and WB data on GDP in Mauro, Paolo (1998) ‘Corruption: 
Causes Consequences, and agenda for further research’ Finance and Development 35: 1 
120 Mauro, Paolo (1995) 'Corruption and Growth' The Quarterly Journal Of Economics 110: 3 pp. 681-712 
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project some of the nominal amount goes into non value adding activities, i.e. 
corruption. These activities have no yield thus the investor receives a lower return on 
his nominal amount. Yields on LDC bonds highlight this risk. Under the standard 
scenario of risk-averse capital, it is realistic to suggest that the treasury bonds of 
corrupt LDCs will require a higher face value price discount or will require a higher 
yield than the bond of a country with lower levels of corruption126.  
Another consequence of corruption is that it draws investment into the markets 
where the potential for rents are highest. This means that money is allocated away 
from the public sector, and as such the provision of health care and education is 
undermined 127 . Corruption reduces spending on health and education, because 
these expenditures do not lend themselves easily to rent extraction128.  For the same 
reasons, the expenditure on operations and maintenance is also reduced.  
High levels of corruption tend to increase expenditure on publically funded 
projects129. This is for the simple reason that those who receive bribes are those that 
are in charge of allocating public funds. This can lead to ‘white elephants’: 
construction projects that are built, not because there is a need for them, but 
because an official has been bribed in order to sanction the project, and provide 
public investment for a construction company to complete it. 
3.3: IFIs: State Prescriptions 
The purpose of this section is not to present an analysis of the effectiveness of the 
anti-corruption efforts of the IFIs, but rather to ask: What do the policy prescriptions 
of the IFIs reveal about their views and understanding of corruption? 
The WB has adopted an anti-corruption strategy that prescribes action in four key 
areas130:  
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a) The elimination of corruption in bank funded projects. This follows from the 
charter, as the bank has a responsibility to its funding members.  
b) Helping countries combat corruption through learning programmes, 
workshops, and training courses conducted by the World Bank Institute131. 
This includes surveys of households, firms and government officials 
c) Mainstreaming anti-corruption in its operational work and policy dialogue. This 
is achieved by building internal capacity through training, research, diagnostic 
tools and knowledge management”132. 
d) Supporting international efforts to combat corruption: The bank is supporting 
international efforts aimed at both the act of corruption in international 
business, as well as internal corruption that has international ramifications133.  
The WB has worked closely with Interpol and the Financial Action Task Force on 
Money Laundering at the international level, as well as the Organisation of American 
States and the Global Coalition for Africa at the regional level. The bank also works 
alongside and supports the efforts of NGO’s in tackling corruption. In particular the 
WB has supported and collaborated with Transparency International in conducting 
research and producing working papers on the topic. 
The emphasis of WB programmes is in tackling corruption at the bureaucratic level 
rather than at preventing state capture or addressing political systems134. The aim of 
the programmes is to decrease economic corruption within the bureaucratic 
functions of the state, rather than corruption of top level officials. This is 
demonstrated in their use of training courses and capacity building. It is certainly true 
that corruption can result from a lack of institutional capacity, and the provision of 
effective training for civil servants can address this. However what this does not 
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address is the political corruption that occurs through the cadre deployment of 
political stooges at the top level of the bureaucracy. Because the views of the WB 
are state centric rather than systematic, their policy focus is on relational corruption 
rather than systematic corruption. 
The policy prescriptions also reveal the extent to which the WB views are informed 
by empirical measurement of corruption. The empirical evidence shows that “Anti-
corruption efforts succeed when rules and regulations are simplified, interactions 
between firms and public officials are limited and burdens on the private sector are 
reduced”.135  Thus a decline in corruption is empirically portrayed as a result of 
liberalisation136. As such the policies of the WB emphasise the need for increased 
economic liberalisation: a convenient policy prescription given that liberalisation has 
been top of the WB agenda since the use of SAPs.  
Some empirical work is beneficial, such as public opinion surveys which offer a way 
of articulating citizens’ concerns e.g. the “Bangalore scorecard” and the 
“Corruptometer” in Argentina137. The international surveys completed by NGOs such 
as TI have also been able to highlight those countries in which corruption is seen to 
be endemic. A number of studies show that participation leads to reduced 
corruption138.  
Views informed by empirical works are by no means problematic. Such studies are 
essential to understanding the scale of bureaucratic corruption and perceptions of 
corruption within the business sector. However, views based on empirical results 
tend to focus on the types of corruption that can be quantifiable and measurable. As 
such, certain types of corruption, such as the politicisation of bureaucracies and 
security services tend to be overlooked.   
The policy prescriptions of the WB demonstrate an institutional understanding of 
corruption that focuses on types of corruption that can be measureable, and 
bureaucratic relational corruption. Such views are state centric and overlook aspects 
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of corruption that occur within, or as a result of the system. The same is true of the 
IMF prescriptions.  
The IMFs’ involvement in addressing corruption is limited by a self-imposed 
restriction to economic aspects of governance 139 . This presents potential policy 
areas of: Improving management of public resources; and supporting the 
development and maintenance of a transparent and stable economic and regulatory 
environment conducive to efficient private sector activities140. 
Due to the difficulty in separating political and economic elements of corruption the 
IMF limits itself to three areas of concern: Institutional reforms of the treasury; budget 
preparation and approval procedures; and tax administration and accounting. In so 
doing the IMF takes an intended position of not countering systematic political 
corruption. In only tackling corruption at a state level, not only does the IMF fail to 
address political corruption, but it also allows anticorruption rhetoric to become a 
political tool in borrowing countries. Good governance rhetoric may be used by an 
incumbent regime in order to obtain international support, however little of this talk is 
ever put into practice.  
The Fund advocates the liberalisation of economies. The assumption that the fund 
makes is that liberal economic policies reduce the opportunity for rent seeking. This 
involves price decontrol, adopting free floating exchange rates and free trade, and 
allowing the market to determine the rate of interest141. However, in some cases the 
adoption of liberal policies has not prevented corruption; in fact it has led to the rise 
of capitalist elites that depend upon it.  
The IMF has also advocated the offering of technical assistance to enhance state 
capacity142. This is aimed at addressing bureaucratic corruption in the administrative 
arms of the state. The aim of the policy is to tackle the corrupt relationship that exists 
between the state and the citizens at the level where the two are most likely to come 
into contact. In many societies this is the most prevailing and corrosive type of 
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corruption. However, where there exists a corrupt relationship between the executive 
of the state and the periphery such policies are ineffective.  
To promote transparency in financial transactions the IMF focuses on four key areas: 
better data dissemination143; fiscal policy through promoting the Code of Good Fiscal 
Practice144; sound monetary and financial policy by encouraging countries to sign up 
to the Code of Good Practice in Monetary and Financial Policy145; and finally, the 
IMF promotes effective banking supervision. These policies are designed to tackle 
the corruption that occurs within the institutions of state finance. They further 
demonstrate how the IMFs’ views and focus on corruption are state centric, with the 
effective running of financial institutions being top of the agenda.  
In the case of systematic political corruption many of these policies are rendered 
ineffective. Whilst they may have some effect on curbing corruption at the 
bureaucratic level, they do not address corruption at the systematic level. The policy 
prescriptions of the IFIs are state centric in this regard, a demonstration of  the views 
of the institutions.  
3.4 The IFIs on corruption: Conclusions 
The IFIs’ conceptualisation of corruption as a characteristic of a failed state 
overlooks the idea of corruption as a consequence of a political system. 
This chapter demonstrates that the IFIs focus on corruption as a state centric 
economic phenomenon which overlooks its systematic political nature. In order to 
combat systematic corruption they would need to re-evaluate their restrictions on 
political involvement. 
The IFIs identify corruption as being “among the greatest obstacles to economic and 
social development”146 and fighting corruption has become a policy priority for the 
development community147.  
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The IFIs focus on corruption as emanating from ineffective states which misdirect 
economic growth148. This is driven by the empirical data, of which the IFIs are major 
contributors to the literature. Thus, by regarding corruption as a state centric concept 
the IFIs are able to prescribe policies that promote their idea of good governance, 
without having to be heavily involved in political affairs. Corruption in this sense can 
be regarded as a behavioural issue, which can be treated by developing institutions.  
This has its benefits; however the state centric attitude of the IFIs overlooks the 
systematic element of corruption: political corruption that occurs as the result of the 
political system. Both the party system and the bureaucratic system are fundamental 
in defining the relationship between the political party and the state. In some 
instances there is a blurring of this divide.  
This can be explained by the functions of the IFIs. The purpose of the IMF as an 
institution is to maintain stability within the international financial system. It is the 
lender of the last resort to countries. Its involvement in the good governance agenda 
stems from its monitoring capabilities. The World Bank, by contrast, is concerned 
with corruption because it has an obligation to those that fund the bank to make sure 
that bank loans are spent in an appropriate manner. The role of the bank in 
promoting development has meant that it has to target corruption.  
The involvement of the IFIs in anti-corruption and good governance efforts has 
developed out of the practical requirement of the institutions. As such, their original 
definitions and attitudes towards corruption have come from a practical standpoint. 
They are able to define and conceptualise corruption any way to suit their purposes. 
In doing this they take a state centric standpoint, rather than view corruption as being 
systematic. This limits their ability to have a long term anticorruption policy. Tackling 
corruption is not just about institutions, but developing adequate political systems. 
                                                                                                                                       
147  World Bank (2012) Accountability and Legitimacy [Accessed on 18/06/2012] 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTPUBLICSECTORANDGOVERNANCE/0,,contentMD
K:22996457~pagePK:148956~piPK:216618~theSitePK:286305,00.html 
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4: Systematic Corruption and Political Parties: The case of the ANC 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to assess whether or not the view of political 
corruption held by the World Bank and the IMF is effective in understanding political 
corruption in South Africa. The previous chapter demonstrated that the IFIs are both 
state centric in their mandates and views on corruption. This chapter argues that the 
IFIs’ understanding is limited as it overlooks the systematic constraints and 
incentives on political parties in the spread of corruption. The theory explored in 
chapter two identifies that political parties are integral to political corruption in many 
ways. By outlining the way in which the ANC as a party has allowed and used 
political corruption in South Africa, the chapter highlights the systematic nature of 
corruption that is not targeted by the policies of the IFIs’. 
It is worth noting that a number of pieces of legislation make corruption illegal in 
South Africa, the most recent being the ‘Prevention and Combating of Corrupt 
Activities act 2004’ 149 . This includes the outlawing of bias, abuse of trust, and 
improper inducement to do or not do anything. Also important to note is that, with 
regard to the distribution of tenders, corruption requires a relational exchange. In 
these terms, a tender that is given in return for financial benefit is illegal; however 
tenders awarded on the basis of friendship are not illegal. 
The existence of corruption within South Africa is not disputed. At a broad level, the 
2011 Transparency International Corruption Perception Index ranked South Africa in 
64th place with a score of 4.1 out of 10 (Where 10 is the least corrupt)150. However in 
the 2012 TI CPI despite a better score of 43% it had fallen to 69th place151. This 
places it at a similar level as Turkey, Georgia, Croatia, Slovakia and Ghana152.  
On a more detailed level, 32.24 % of firms in South Africa expect to pay a bribe, or 
offer a “gift” in order to obtain a government contract153.  What the data points to is 
that there is a high perception of corruption in business in South Africa. Further 
                                            
149Prevention and Combatting of Corruption Act RSA, 12 of 2004   
150 Transparency International (2011) [Accessed 18/06/2012] http://cpi.transparency.org/cpi2011/results/ 
151 In 2012 TI introduced a new system where scores are out of 100 rather than out of 10. 
Transparency International (2012)  [Accessed 15/01/2013] http://cpi.transparency.org/cpi2012/results/ 
152 Transparency International (2011) 
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evidence shows that there is a high perception of corruption in the political system. In 
a survey conducted by ‘Afro-Barometer’, when asked “how many of the following 
people do you think are involved in corruption, or haven’t you heard enough to say?” 
45% answered “all” or “most” for their elected local councillors; 36% think the same 
for national government officials; 26% for MPs; and 22% for the President’s office154. 
However, these are only a measurement of perceptions and they are notoriously 
over cynical. In contrast to these high perceptions the UNODC found the experience 
of corruption to be much lower155. Perceptions of corruption tend to over exaggerate 
the problem, and they are driven by accounts of corruption in the media. Having said 
this, the existence of corruption at all levels in the South African political system is 
apparent.  
The chapter starts with a brief account of corruption prior to 1994 both within the 
state and within the ANC. This serves to demonstrate that corruption in South Africa 
is not a new phenomenon. The chapter then outlines the relevant political systems in 
South Africa highlighting incentives and constraints on corruption. The chapter then 
uses cases of corruption to highlight the systematic nature of corruption firstly in the 
Mbeki/Mandela era, and then under the presidency of Jacob Zuma.  
The purpose of the chapter is to demonstrate the systematic nature of some of the 
corruption in South Africa, thus demonstrating the limitations of the IFIs’ 
understanding of corruption as a state centric concept. The cases show how even 
though the state may use the services of the IFIs in a transparent manner, it may still 
be a corrupt state.  
Systematic or Systemic Corruption 
This chapter focusses on state centric corruption in South Africa. That is, corruption 
that is caused by the political structures and systems, and the corrupting of those 
structures and systems. The chapter refers to the ANC as the political party, rather 
than the government to which party members belong. 
                                            
154 Afrobarometer (2006) 'Resurgent Perceptions of Corruption in South Africa' Afrobarometer Briefing Paper No. 
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The chapter uses the South African case to demonstrate the political nature of 
systematic corruption in order to argue that it is possible for the IFIs to engage with a 
country in a transparent manner despite that country being corrupt. However this 
does not mean that South Africa does not also suffer from systemic corruption. 
There have been a number of cases of corruption that have not been related to 
political systems. For example the Limpopo administration has been rife with 
corruption. Also, the ‘Travelgate’ episode showed that there are members of the 
ruling party that engage in corrupt practices on a regular basis.  
In 2004 110 MPs were reported to be involved in a scam involving fraudulent travel 
expenses. Almost all were in the ANC including several members in ministerial 
positions156. Of this number only 8 have admitted guilt.   
The way in which this was carried out is not complicated. Travel agents contracted to 
parliamentary travel arrangements offered politicians the option of exchanging their 
travel expenses for cash157. This proved to be very popular until Harry Charlton blew 
the whistle, for which he lost his job. The police made little headway with the 
investigation and the case was passed on to the scorpions. Few of those accused 
were charged; fewer still punished. What this case demonstrates is that there is 
corruption within South Africa which is not connected to the political system. 
4.1 Corruption in South Africa prior to 1994 
Corruption in South Africa is not a new phenomenon158. At both the bureaucratic and 
at the political levels the existence of corruption pre dates the introduction of Majority 
rule in 1994. Many in the popular press and in the population as a whole have a 
perception that corruption within the ANC demonstrates the failings of the party in 
government. A small white minority go further and argue that the high levels of 
corruption demonstrate that the ANC is unfit to govern. These summations are not 
valid. There are many aspects of corruption in South Africa, many, especially within 
                                            
156 Johnson R.W. (2005) ‘Trial reveals corrupt drift of South Africa’ The Sunday Times Jun 05 2005 
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the police service and the health service, are inherited from the National Party 
government prior to 1994159. 
As a means of understanding corruption in general, there is little to be gained from 
comparing the current South African government with that which came before160. 
Contemporary South Africa is a liberal democracy, with a strong constitution and 
guaranteed freedoms. Prior to 1994 “the state system was itself a form of 
institutionalised grand corruption” with the authoritarian regime kept in place by 
entrenched patronage161. Yet to produce an assessment of current corruption it is 
necessary to take account of those elements which are inherited.  
4.1.1 The State 
Prior to 1994 the state was propped up by Afrikaner patronage. Apartheid was a 
means of creating a class of wealthy, dominant Afrikaners. The means of achieving 
this was a system of patronage. Along with this explicit form of corruption there 
developed a far more covert enterprise. Once the influential elite no longer had the 
inclination or discipline to maintain apartheid they reoriented the state to create a 
system which served their own financial interests. As Hyslop notes, “The ethos of the 
national party leadership almost visibly shifted from one of service to the Volk to one 
of the establishment of Swiss bank accounts.”162 This was the forerunner to the 
system that was intended to readjust such discrimination, that of BEE.  
The corruption under apartheid was largely bureaucratic; especially in the police, 
intelligence, and security forces, and provincial and homeland administrations163. In 
the late 1980s the state security forces were being used not only to uphold 
apartheid, but also to undermine the liberation movement, especially during 
negotiations. The main priority of the police was not to prevent crime in the total 
population, but to protect the white minority.  
Covert operations were a part of this security framework using funds from the 
Department of Defence. These went to both the state security apparatus, but also to 
                                            
159 Ibid.  
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subversive groups in the homelands. This resulted large unaccountable financial 
flows. 
Outside the covert aspect of state security, corruption was inherent in the 
bureaucracy. In particular within the police and the health services bribery was seen 
as a major problem. 164. In 1994 a deputy director in the Department of Health was 
suspended for the second time for the acceptance of monetary incentives for the 
rewarding of contracts165.  
Corruption was also a problem in the homeland administrations. Elements of this 
have transferred into the new administrations. Of the nine new provinces, those that 
have seen the lowest levels of corruption have been Gauteng, Northern Cape and 
Western Cape166. These are the three new provinces that did not i corporate former 
homelands. 
The important legacies are mainly in the corruption within the police force and the 
provinces dealing with the former homelands.  
4.1.2 The ANC 
One of the defining characteristics of the ANC is that it has historically defined itself 
as a liberation movement167.  As a liberation movement the party saw themselves as 
being embodied in, as opposed to representatives for, their constituency168. In this 
case the constituency is “the people”169. The transition to operating as a political 
party has caused a change not only in the role of the organisation, but also the way 
in which members operate within it and are accountable to those outside. This 
section presents a number of characteristics of liberation movements, some of which 
have rescinded, others which have not.  
Liberation movements are not political parties. The two entities operate in very 
different ways. As stated in chapter two, the role of the political party is to shape 
public opinion, mobilise the electorate, select candidates for office, and organise the 
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party and electorate around common issues. The purpose of a liberation movement 
is very different: by definition the purpose of the movement is to achieve Liberation. 
In doing this their structure is very different to that of a political party. 
Liberation movements tend to have centralised power structures and developed 
hierarchies. These movements are not run on democratic principles. This is 
especially true of the ANC pre 1994. Whilst the ANC was committed to non-racial 
democracy and the principles of the Freedom Charter reiterated this, the history of 
the organisation and its operations in the early 1990’s created pressures that limited 
the ability to convert to being a political party. Ottaway argues the ANC was not 
ready to operate democratically170. Operating in exile for 30 years required the party 
to have a strong central power. This lack of democratic principles and centralised 
power meant that once in office, what the party deemed to be routine behaviour, 
outside observers regarded as patronage and corruption.  
One way in which liberation movements are like political parties, and indeed all 
organisations, is that they require funding. Whereas political party funding, although 
often controversial, is legally regulated the funding of liberation movements is not. In 
many cases such movements develop mutually beneficial relationships with 
organised crime as a means of obtaining funds.  
The ANC was no exception to this. There were links between the ANC and 
organised crime, largely through the recruitment of tsotsis. Starting in the 1950’s the 
ANC had a adopted a policy of recruiting petty criminals into the organisation, 
especially into the armed wing Umkhonto we Sizwe171 It was widely acknowledged at 
the time that some leaders of the ANC in exile had come from criminal backgrounds, 
such as Robert Resha and Joe Modise, commander of Umkhonto we Sizwe.  
This criminal activity was not the official policy of the party, but a number of people 
were involved. ANC members were involved in the smuggling of Mandrax into, as 
well as the smuggling of stolen cars out of, South Africa 172 . Joe Modise was 
embroiled in such activity. His personal history and the nature of the work that he 
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was doing for the movement meant that he was deeply involved in the complicated 
networks of organised crime and smuggling in the region.  
Such activity was frowned upon by the centre of the party. Not only did it undermine 
the political legitimacy of the party, but also the criminals recruited into the party 
were easy targets for the state intelligence services173. It is a common police tactic to 
cultivate professional criminals as informants, and the absorption of such networks 
into the ANC jeopardised the organisation. However, while much was said on the 
subject, very little action was taken.  
This liberation mentality continued after 1994. The introduction of democracy and the 
election of the ANC did not bring about an internal change within the organisation, 
rather it merely adapted to its new role. In a speech made in 1997 Dullah Omar, the 
then Minister of Justice, stated that: “What we are required to do is to Identify our 
role as government - in other words as a political party – but at the same time to 
ensure that we as an African National Congress remain a liberation movement”174. 
He goes on to say: “In our liberation movement... we see no contradiction between 
being a political party and a liberation movement at the same time”175. This latter 
quote was in fact in reply to the accusations of patronage within the organisation. 
What is revealed by this is that the ANC in government, especially in the early years, 
still had a conceptualisation of itself as a liberation movement in government, rather 
than as an elected political party. This has important consequences in terms of 
attitudes towards patronage. 
4.2 SA Political Systems 
This section outlines the main political systems in South Africa and how they may 
lead to corruption. It demonstrates that there are causes of political corruption that 
emanate from the system rather than being specific to the political party. Much of the 
corruption in South Africa is not a product of individual political decision and agency, 
it is in fact a result of the systematic constraints and incentives that lead to parties 
and people being corrupt. The systems in question are the: Electoral System; the 
Bureaucratic System; the Party System; and the party funding process.  
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4.2.1 Electoral System 
Prior to 1994 South African elections were conducted using the ‘First Past The Post’ 
(FPTP) system. Since 1994 elections have been conducted using a ‘PR droop quota' 
system. This involves a party list system and an element of ‘top up’. The initial 
decision to change the system was made during the negotiations over the new 
constitution. In many ways it can be seen as a constitutional compromise, and the 
decision did not go unopposed.  
The emergence of PR as the electoral system of choice was based upon the idea 
that it was inclusive, and that it was more reconciliatory than the existing FPTP 
system176.  Under a FPTP system the ANC would have won an estimated 70% - 
80% of parliamentary seats in each of the elections since 2004177. This estimation is 
based upon the location and concentration of the population demographic groups 
that would have been least likely to vote ANC.  This would obviously have been 
beneficial to the ruling party, at the cost of crowding out smaller parties. It would 
have been in their interest to opt for such an election procedure; however by 
accepting a PR system as a constitutional compromise a number of benefits are 
accrued. Smaller parties are able to realistically compete for the few seats they may 
obtain. There is no threshold on how much of the vote is needed to gain seats, so 
even small parties can get representation in the legislature. The ANC accepted the 
deal for two reasons: Firstly because it was predicted to produce better long term 
stability; and secondly because by accepting PR the ANC were allaying suspicions 
that it wanted total political dominance. 
The adoption of a PR system puts inclusivity ahead of accountability178. Corruption is 
a symptom of such a lack of accountability in the system. In the case of the South 
African electoral system, the emphasis on inclusivity led to a system being adopted 
that did not have constituencies, and did not have direct voting for candidates. 
Candidates are appointed from a list. The more votes a party wins, the more people 
from their list are awarded office. However, candidates are not accountable directly 
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to a constituency. As such they are not subject to the democratic constraint of 
potentially being voted out by their constituents based upon personal ground. This 
means that individuals are not held directly to account by their constituents, and as 
such their behaviour is not constrained. This is a form of systematic corruption as 
corruption occurs as a result of the lack of systematic constraints. 
Another aspect of this is that it places even more power within the party. The centre 
of the party decides who will be on the list, and at what position they will be. This 
means that there is very little accountability to the population especially of those at 
the top of the list. The ability to be put into one of these safe spots ends up being 
based not upon ability to be an MP, but as a reward for party loyalty. This process 
leads to an exclusion of the population. 
4.2.2 Bureaucratic System 
The politicisation of the bureaucracy is one of the main ways in which a political 
system can become corrupt. This has been the case in South Africa where the on-
going politicisation of the public service, based on cadre deployment, has created a 
system that is controlled by the political centre.  
Under the apartheid government the bureaucracy was used as a way of supporting 
white privilege.  Throughout the bureaucratic system, appointment was based upon 
colour. The system was used to support the interests of the white middle and 
working class.  
This system was identified by the ANC to be a bastion of white privilege and the race 
balance within the workforce was seen as immoral. Irrespective of the skills gap that 
had developed as a result of education bias, the ANC saw the bureaucratic system 
as being based on apartheid and colonialism, and as such in dire need of reform179. 
For the ANC the skills gap that existed was not important. What was important was 
that the new system reflected the demographic make up of the nation. 
The reformation of a transition bureaucracy does not necessarily lead to corruption, 
however in many cases it does. South Africa is such a case. The most important 
factor was ensuring that the race bias of the past was deconstructed and that it was 
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replaced by a more ‘moral’ system. However, if positions are not to be rewarded 
purely on merit, then by what other measure should they be awarded? For the ANC 
the answer to this question was party loyalty. 
Cadre deployment of ANC loyalists was not merely a bi-product of reform; it was the 
aim of the reform180. The ANC conducted strategic politicisation of the bureaucracy, 
especially during the era of Mandela and Mbeki. The ANC identified that the 
‘transformation of the state involves first and foremost, extending the power of the 
NLM (National Liberation Movement) over all levels of power: the army, the police, 
the bureaucracy, intelligence structures, judiciary, parastatals, and agencies such as 
regulatory bodies, the public broadcaster, and so on’181. The ANC set out to erode 
the distinction between the political party and the state. This is essentially a spoils 
system, whereby the winner of the election is, through cadre deployment into public 
service, is able to politicise the state and form a bureaucracy loyal to the political 
party.  
This cadre deployment has resulted in an erosion of the party state divide. This was 
especially prominent during the Mandela and Mbeki presidencies. Thabo Mbeki is 
commonly seen to have been the main political driving force between 1994 and 
Zuma’s election in 2009. This era was characterised by a centralisation of political 
power around the top of the ANC. 
4.2.3 Party System 
The ANC is a dominant party. It has not lost an election since it came to power in 
1994, and it is yet to fight an election where there is a real possibility of losing182. 
There are two major impacts of this. First, democratic constraints do not apply. If the 
party has to fight a competitive election there is an incentive not to partake in 
corruption. Second, the separation of party and state becomes blurred.  
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Figure 1 shows that the level of support for the ANC in elections is not in decline. 
Fig.1183 





Source: SA IEC 
This is because of the high levels of identification to the party amongst the Black 
electorate. In a survey conducted by Afrobarometer it was found that 60% of the 
electorate “felt close” to a party and of these two thirds inclined towards the ANC184. 
This is not surprising. The ANC still has some political capital as the liberation 
movement amongst older voters. It also, as the dominant part of the tripartite 
alliance, represents the interests of the majority of th  population. The next largest 
affiliation is to the DA, a party that is trying to shake off its ‘White Party’ image.  
This level of dominance has both positive and negative externalities. On the one 
hand “political stability can establish the preconditions for the longer term 
entrenchment of democracy”185. This suggests that it is better, in the initial period of 
democracy, to have a dominant party, as competition among parties competing for 
the new state can cause instability. On the other hand the ANC cannot handle the 
strains of transition on its own186. Given the social upheaval post 1994, the ANC 
alone does not have the capacity to oversee the transition.  
The dominance of the ANC also re-racialises politics in South Africa as political 
competition is structured around historical affiliations rather than policy or ideology. 
Schrire argues that this therefore means that competition is structured along ethnic 
and racial lines187. This being the case, any opposition to the ANC is construed as 
polarising the electorate on racial or ethnic terms. 
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A further problem associated with dominant parties is that they are able to abuse the 
advantages of incumbency and the state media to ‘get elected time and time 
again’188. The party in power is able to mobilise the resources of the state media in 
order to ensure re-election. The reason this is particularly problematic in dominant 
party systems is because over time they are able to place party cadres in positions 
of public media.  
The ANC has politicised the South African state, leading to a convergence of State 
and Party189. The distinction between the role of the party and the functions of the 
state has become blurred. Having benefited from a long period of incumbency the 
ANC defines itself as a government, rather than as a party in government office. This 
has allowed the ANC to benefit from “organisational resources” 190 available to it as 
the government, such as the bureaucracy, as well as the “electoral resources” 191 it 
has as a political party. 
These organisational resources can also be employed to manage the final feature of 
the ANC as a dominant party. That is, the internal politics of the party. A large 
amount of the political competition that occurs in South Africa does not happen 
between parties, as is the democratic norm. Rather, it takes place within the ruling 
party. Reddy identifies features of the ANC that he draws from a comparison to the 
Congress party of India. The ANC is a dominant party legitimised though mass 
support, but consisting of many factions that operate on the notion of consensus 
seeking within the party, with outside opposition cooperating with factions within the 
party to gain political influence and access192. Reddy argues that this contributes to 
the consolidation of democracy, which it may do, however it presents the opportunity 
for those in power to use corruption as both a tool and a weapon193. 
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The ANC as a dominant party has two effects on political competition in South Africa. 
The first of these is that political competition is internalised. Contrary to the theory 
that dominant parties stifle political completion, what is demonstrated by the ANC is 
that competition is internalised, it happens intra-party rather than inter-party. The 
ANC, and more broadly the Tripartite Alliance, does not represent a unified political 
unit. Within the party there is a political spectrum from those who are on the far right 
who are regarded as ‘fascists’, and those on the far left in the SACP and 
COSATU194. However, these different factions do not compete in the open political 
domain; they are factions competing within the ANC. This means that ultimately the 
central National Executive Committee can control political competition within the 
country. 
The second effect that the dominant party has on competition occurs as a result of 
the first. The multiple competing factions can be controlled through a system of 
patronage and internal bargaining. The leader is able to offer political office to 
potential rivals representing different factions in order to quell any internal 
competition. This is not unusual and it is not limited to dominant parties. The 
appointment of Gordon Brown as Chancellor of the Exchequer in the UK was 
arguably a way for Tony Blair to quell any potential competition. But  the ability to 
use patronage is extended in dominant parties. With the blurred distinction between 
state and party, leaders are able to use public appointments to their advantage much 
more. 
4.2.4 Party Financing 
The South African political system allows for both private and public funding of 
political parties. In this respect South Africa is one of the few countries that provides 
public funding for political parties. This is in part recognition of the difficulty of raising 
finances, especially for parties representing poor minorities, and also a way of 
ensuring inclusivity. Provided a party conforms to the criteria set out in the ‘Public 
Funding of Represented Political Parties Act 1997’ then they are eligible for 
funding195. This means that, in principle and at a fundamental level, there is no 
barrier to entry based on cost. This allows for interests and grievances to be 
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formalised into a party and voiced in the political domain without being restricted by 
finance. 
However, beyond this basic level, the state funding of political parties does not 
amount to much. Chapter 2 highlights the reasons why parties need funding. The 
operational costs of a party the size of the ANC are high, as is the cost of fighting 
elections. In order to operate the ANC cannot rely on public finances, it must turn to 
the private sector. 
The funding system in South Africa allows for political parties to raise funds from its 
members and from other sources such as international and domestic business, and 
civil society groups196. Contributions may be made directly, or in the form of ‘in kind’ 
benefits such as voluntary work, free office space, free advertising, and other goods 
and services provided for free to the party. What is important to note about the South 
African party funding system is that in terms of private funding and donations there 
are a number of ways in which systems may be abused. 
The need for parties to explore alternative avenues for funding is a result of the 
inability for any party to successfully fund itself through membership. This is not a 
problem that is unique to South Africa. In the UK parties receive most of their funding 
from donations, or Trades Unions in the case of the Labour Party. The South African 
case however is amplified by domestic income levels, and high levels of inequality. 
As such, political parties in South Africa have traditionally found it hard to raise 
money from membership fees. 
One alternative that has developed is the selling of face time with political leaders. 
There have been a number of ANC initiatives which have capitalised on party 
members being in positions of state power. This includes one-to-one meetings with 
ministers and Progressive Business Forum dinners where there are hundreds of 
guests paying to dine with members of the government.  
It is important to note that neither the abuse of the funding system or the lack of 
political will to change it is specific to the ANC. Across all the main parties in South 
Africa there is no desire to change the funding system. The DA has not expressed 
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any desire to change the party funding mechanism because, like the ANC, they 
depend upon it remaining in its current form. 
4.3 Corruption in the Mandela/Mbeki Era 
This section gives examples of systematic corruption during the presidencies of 
Mandela and Mbeki. These have been combined as Mbeki was the dominant 
political force during both. This period is characterised by the centralisation of 
political power around the core of the party, and the erosion of the distinction 
between the party and the state. Between 1994 and 2009 the ANC actively sought to 
politicise the South African state.  
4.3.1 A New Government: The Liberation Movement in Public Office 
Corruption in the early years was partly caused by the existing structures of the 
movement and the naivety of the new government. Inexperienced ministers and new 
public managers were ignorant of many of the proceedings of government including 
tendering procedures. One Northern Province MEC conceded that “We have never 
ruled before. We never even knew what a tender board was until we came to 
power”197. The apparent favouritism in the tendering process in the early years of 
ANC rule could indeed have been due to the inexperience and naivety of minsters. 
The overlapping nature of Black political and business elites meant that intended or 
otherwise, there was some favouritism in the allocation of public contracts198.  
A characteristic of the movement that allowed the spread of corruption was the 
embedded secrecy adopted whilst operating under apartheid. The ANC was always 
run on a “need to know” basis, which was an important operating requirement in the 
apartheid environment199. Once it came into power, this culture of secrecy continued. 
In so doing, the ability for corruption to prevail is self-evident. The organisation was 
built on secrecy and so even when corrupt behaviour was observed by peers it went 
unreported.  
The naivety of the organisation in no way justifies the corruption of members in the 
early years of government. The organisational secrecy has also rescinded, and after 
18 years in power the ANC cannot blame corruption on teething problems, nor on 
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their history as a liberation movement.200. The transformation from being a liberation 
movement to being a political party took time as there was a lack of political will to 
change and there was an incentive to capitalise on the political capital. Other 
liberation tendencies were harder to remove, for example political solidarity and 
comradeship. Members of the movement have a shared experience of struggle. This 
creates a sense of loyalty among members. This comradeship has created the 
opportunity for corruption within the ANC in two ways: the reluctance of members to 
be ‘whistle blowers’201; and the creation of patronage base on loyalty networks202. 
Some of this political culture of the exiled ANC transferred into the party post 1994.  
The loyalty networks that existed prior to 1994 were still evident after the transition. 
Hyslop argues that “such loyalties can easily be transmuted into patronage 
networks”203. The small black elite that have emerged has been arguably based on a 
‘jobs for the boys’ type of patronage. This has largely emerged from the policies of 
Black Economic Empowerment (BEE). These affirmative action policies have been 
regarded as a type of cronyism. Those who are close to the party are rewarded the 
greatest. One example of such behaviour is the allocation of housing tenders in 
Mpumalanga which appears to have been based upon such friendships204.  
4.3.2 The Blurring of the Party State Divide: ANC Patronage 
Since 1994 the ANC has slowly blurred the distinction between the party and the 
state in South Africa. Through political appointments the ANC has managed to take 
control of the public service, the intelligence services, the police and the public 
media. This has not been a negative externality of reforming the state and the public 
sector. It has been a strategic advance by the ANC and as such represents a form of 
corruption. 
In South Africa appointments are justified under the auspices of reforming the state. 
However, under the leadership of Mbeki, the control of appointments was 
centralised. Even though the party already had control of appointment, through the 
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Deployment Committee, this political power shifted and came under Mbeki’s control. 
The interests of the mass party became less recognised.  
In South Africa there are three sectors that have been politicised by the ANC: the 
military and the police; the media; and foreign affairs. The last of these has seen the 
lowest levels of the three and can be justified by the fact that while in exile many of 
the ANC comrades developed expertise and interests in foreign affairs205. A Survey 
suggests that as many as 60% of South African Ambassadors are considered to be 
political appointees206. The police service appears to be the most politicised207. This 
is partly due to the attempts under the Mbeki government to “shore up” the police 
department as a measure to combat the rising crime levels in the country208. The 
politicisation of the police and the military is also due to the National Integration 
Process. This mainly affected the army in the 1990’s by sanctioning the integration of 
ANC former resistance fighters and veterans. This serves as a reason rather than a 
justification for politicisation of the arms of the state. 
Another reason was the determination of the ANC to “transform the state”209. This 
started as a legitimate process to increase the proportion of black civil servants, 
especially at senior levels. However, this transformed into a process of politicisation. 
The ANC ensured that its own “cadres” occupied positions within the framework of 
the state210. Not only did this politicise the bodies of the state bureaucracy, but it also 
undermined their effectiveness211. Those who received positions were often under 
qualified for the position. The capacity of the South African state started to weaken 
and this was further enhanced by its politicisation and merger with the ANC as a 
party. 
The origin of the ANC advance on the state emanates from the party’s own doctrine 
of centralism, a hangover from the party’s development as a liberation movement. 
ANC members are bound by this ideal of democratic centralism. The party’s 
leadership is expected to exercise ‘maximum discipline’ among its members, and 
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ensure that irrespective of where party members are deployed they remain under the 
direction of the central party structures212.  
Following the 1994 election win the ANC identified the need to reform the 
architecture of state apparatus. Between 1994 and 1997 there were a number of 
political appointments into the civil service, often as a reward for service during the 
struggle. However it was after the 1997 Mafikeng National Conference that the total 
strategic politicisation of the state really started 213 . The conference passed a 
resolution on cadre deployment with a stated aim to: Identify key centres of power for 
deployment; and draw up a comprehensive deployment policy and strategy214.  
This was part of Mbeki’s strategy to politicise the state and to extend ANC powers 
into all areas of the public domain. Senior ANC politicians were deployed to head 
most state institutions. These included the Reserve Bank, the Prosecution Service 
and the Revenue Service. It was made very clear to these appointees that their 
primary loyalty was to the ANC central organisational structures. This is what 
Hannah Arendt has described as a ‘dual authority’215: Ostensible authority resides in 
the constitution, parliament, and cabinet, but real authority resides in the party.  
4.3.3 BEE/BBEEE: Clientelism 
The ANC has used client networks in order to consolidate its position as the 
dominant party. The transformation of the state and bureaucracy demonstrates a 
level of patronage within South Africa, whereas the affirmative action policy of BEE 
has given rise to accusations of the development of clientelistic networks.  
According to some, the transfer of wealth from the white minority to the black 
majority had started before the ANC had come to power, and had in fact been driven 
by white business216. With the end of apartheid approaching there was arguably an 
economic appeasement, with the transfer of assets to black ownership. This was 
made to look like a large scale transfer of wealth, but was in fact relatively small. The 
vehicles for this were the New African Investments Limited, Real African Investment 
Limited, and others.  
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Whether or not a sustainable or even effective wealth transfer mechanism was in 
place prior to 1994 is debatable. What is more certain is that the ANC needed a 
policy to transfer assets across the racial divide in a country rife with poverty and 
inequality. 
The BEE act came into being in 2003. The intention was to create a transfer of 
wealth from white minority, to the previously disadvantaged black majority. This has 
latterly given way to Broad Based Black Economic Empowerment (BBBEE), which 
looks to continue the affirmative action policies but targeting a larger sample of the 
population. BEE has given rise to corruption in two ways, the development of 
clientelistic networks, and the fraudulent practice of ‘White Fronting’. 
The BEE policies of the ANC have created a new class cleavage, and for the first 
time in South Africa it is a Black-Black split217. A number of Blacks have benefitted 
greatly from the BEE policies of the ANC, and they are “increasingly… protective of 
their gains”218. The result of these policies is that a few wealthy Black entrepreneurs 
are being awarded key government contracts or special deals on land allocation and 
project development. This has given rise to the pejorative term ‘Tenderpreneur’, 
meaning someone who has built up wealth based on obtaining government tenders. 
This has resulted in the exclusion of the poorer Black population who do not have 
access to the resources to compe e with “their wealthier Black Brothers” or, more 
importantly, “do not have the political clout of being ANC insiders” 219. The new 
division in South Africa is between the Black rich and the Black poor. It is between 
the elite ANC insiders, and the poor. 
The reciprocal side to this relationship is that, if you benefit from the granting of a 
tender or some other access to wealth granted by the ANC you are expected to 
repay the debt to the party. Alternatively this relationship can represent the 
rewarding, by the ANC, of former members or comrades for past allegiance and 
assistance in the struggle220. The links between the ANC and the new elite are in 
part founded upon the comradeship of the struggle. Those that assisted in the ANC 
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coming to power are now receiving their reward. As already stated, the overlap in 
membership between the new capitalist elite and the ANC existed prior to 1994. The 
allocation of tenders is in part based on insider relationships that were forged before 
the ANC came to power. The loyalty networks of the past have become the client 
networks of the present.  
Ryklief argues that the result of this is a nascent Black ruling class that, although 
numerically small, is dependent on White capital and the ANC. As such is willing to 
act as a consolidated and conspiratorial force in order to maintain itself221. 
This not only summarises the clientilistic nature of the BEE project, but also points to 
the other aspect of corruption involved in BEE. That is the corruption and fraud that 
occurs in the private sector in order to gain access to these tenders and potential 
rents. 
The marginalisation of white business since 1994 has resulted in the use of ‘fronting’ 
by white businesses in order to gain access to government, both economically and 
politically. Scott, as outlined in chapter two, identified that influence buying in post-
independence regimes is a result of the marginalisation of the former elite222. Those 
who have the material but not the political resources are incentivised to buy 
influence. Whilst ‘fronting’ does not represent this fully, it does highlight the role of 
marginalised interests in corruption in new regimes.  
Fronting refers to the practice of White owned companies placing Blacks in a 
position that would make it seem as if they either own the company, or are at least in 
a decision making position223. Extreme examples of the practice have involved the 
promotion of low level staff, such as cleaners and drivers, to positions of 
shareholding without the staff’s knowledge in order to improve the company’s BEE 
scorecard 224 . Such practices are widely used in Botswana and Zimbabwe by 
international companies to get around citizen ownership laws. Either a citizen is 
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given a non-voting share in the company, or a holding company is created225. At face 
value the company gaining the tender has good BEE credentials. However, a holding 
company is gaining the profits. In other cases Black individuals have willingly acted 
as a front to gain a tender, and then passed on the contract to a White owned 
company who does the work for “higher loot”226. This encourages corruption further 
down the project line as a percentage of the money is taken by the front man and 
then by the company. The BBBEE codes of good practice are currently being revised 
to prevent such practices227. 
BEE and BBEEE have given rise to clientelism. The relationship between the 
government, the new Black elite, and the old guard white business is now 
characterised by the power relationship between the ANC and private interests. 
However it is not only through patron client relationships that the ANC has 
consolidated power. The Party has also used a system of patronage to repay party 
loyalty with positions within the state.   
These forms of corruption are largely subversive. The issuing of positions of 
patronage and the clientelistic relationships developed through BEE though 
corruption are often legal. The remaining case studies reflect the involvement of the 
ANC party members in illegal corruption. In each case there is an element of party 
involvement either directly as a perpetrator of corruption, or indirectly as the 
comradeship and networks of the party members have been utilised to cover up 
evidence and protect members.  
4.3.4 The Arms Deal 
The most notorious case of corruption that continues to dominate the SA media to 
this day is the bribery and corruption involved in the “Arms Deal”. This is the most 
covered case in the literature and there are many aspects to it. The main concern of 
this dissertation is the way in which the events surrounding the arms deal shed light 
on the corruption within the ANC, and in particular the role of the party mechanism in 
instigating and covering up the transactions.  
                                            
225 A holding company is a company or firm that owns other companies outstanding stock. Such firms often do 
not produce any goods or services themselves, rather their sole purpose is to own shares of other companies. 
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In September 1999 the South African government approved a new Arms acquisition 
programme. A 1996 white paper had identified South Africa’s most immediate 
security threat to be a domestic one228. Despite this, of the four available design 
options for the re-structuring of the SANDF, cabinet approved the one that 
emphasised reduced man power and an increase in capital intensity229. Following 
this Armscor, the domestic defence procurement company issued tenders to foreign 
suppliers. The major pieces were submarines, cCorvettes, helicopters, and fixed 
wing aircraft.  
The international arms industry is secretive, non-transparent, and is dependent upon 
commissions and bribes230. A few large firms dominate the market and compete for 
deals. The nature of what the firms sell makes the market very non transparent. The 
integration of different types of hardware and software make it difficult to assess the 
price of any given piece of equipment. The purchase of a pr duct often includes the 
physical equipment, as well as the weapon platform, spares, and services. All of 
which are included in the total price. For example, Grippen aircraft sold to Brazil had 
a lower price than those sold to South Africa due to different weapon platforms and 
specifications. Because there are few firms, deals are often secured through the 
payment of bribes and commissions, and the promise of offsets. Both of these are 
often included in the cost of the deal, so there is little expense to the firm. Cost plus 
contracts and relatively small fines for failure to deliver offsets mean that relatively 
few of the promised benefits materialise.  
The failure of offsets to materialise in South Africa as well as the overall cost of the 
procurement deal has caused political fallout. Much of this is centred on the rampant 
corruption that the deal invoked. 
BAE Systems, the British defence supplier, paid an alleged R1.73 billion in 
commissions to agents within South Africa231. Recipients included Fana Hlongwane 
who served as a special advisor to the then Defence Minister Joe Modise and Tony 
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Yengeni, the former ANC Chief Whip who received a 4x4 from a company involved 
in the deal. The commissions were paid through myriad front companies and 
intermediaries. The purpose however was the same: try to persuade those in charge 
of the decision for tender to choose ‘correctly’. This has resulted in tenders being 
awarded to companies who were far from the lowest bidders, and in some cases had 
been ruled out altogether only then to pull through and win the contract. 
The sources of corruption around the arms deal included domestic firms as well. The 
most documented of these cases is the relationship between Shabir Shaik and 
Jacob Zuma. In the trial of Shabir Shaik it emerged that there existed a long term 
corrupt relationship between the accused and Jacob Zuma232. More specifically it 
was shown that Zuma received large payments from Shaik in order to use his 
position to act on Shaik’s behalf in securing a share deal that involved a UK based 
arms contractor. The subsequent cover up of this case dem nstrates the attitude of 
the ANC towards corruption within the party. 
Hyslop states that “what is most disturbing about the ANC’s response to the arms 
scandal has been its strong tendency to place organisational loyalty above 
probity”233.  In many cases this was driven by self-interest, however what is more 
widely observed is the “solidaristic political culture” of the party, and the preference 
to deal with these matters internally. The 2000 Parliamentary Standing Committee 
on Public Accounts played a lead role in probing into the scandal surrounding the 
arms deal. Andrew Feinstein, the then leading ANC member on the Committee, was 
a key actor in opening the deal up to scrutiny. Feinstein was “squeezed out” of the 
Standing Committee for taking a stance which differed from that of the party. 
Whilst Feinstein was “appalled” by the way the party had closed ranks around the 
issue, it is hardly surprising that it did234. Feinstein completed his education overseas 
and got into politics as an advisor to Jabu Moleketi in 1994, as such he had not been 
directly involved in the struggle. He was not a true insider in the loyalty networks of 
the ANC. The party mobilised these networks to close around the issue and supress 
it.  
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What this case demonstrates is not only the level of corruption within the ANC, but 
also the role of the political party in facilitating such actions and also covering them 
up. The party is a movement based on tight loyalty networks and has a preference 
for (not) dealing with such misbehaviour internally. Part of the reluctance to confront 
the issue is based upon the extent to which it penetrated into the party. Furthermore 
the cover up of the deal demonstrates the ability of the ANC to exert its power 
through theoretically neutral arms of the state.  
4.3.5 Party Funding: Chancellor House and the PBF 
From 1994 until the mid 2000’s The ANC was consistently short of funds. While it 
was able to obtain large donations and generate money around election times, there 
was very little in between. There were times when it could barely pay salaries to 
administrators and party workers. This tight financial situation was further 
exacerbated by poor accountancy and internal financial management. This put a 
massive strain on the party, especially as the financial security and stability was an 
integral aspect of the party’s transition from being a liberation movement to being a 
political party in office. 
During this period the ANC could not rely on its traditional sources of funding. As a 
liberation movement it had been able to survive through external funding, especially 
from the Soviet Union and Swedish governments. Much of this support had not been 
in the form of cash funding, rather it had been ‘in kind’. These were not sustainable 
sources of funding for the new government. The Soviet Union had broken up, and 
the ANC required finances to pay its workers and fund elections rather than ‘in kind’ 
benefits such as tractors and machinery.  
The ANC tried at least two methods of party funding before setting up Chancellor 
House and the PBF. Firstly, it used what Martin Plaut and Paul Holden refer to as the 
‘Foreign Charitable Model’235. This refers to a method of party financing dependent 
upon donations from overseas. This was initially quite successful for the ANC. 
The main factor for the success of the ‘Foreign Charitable Model’ was Nelson 
Mandela. In the late 1990’s he was one of the most recognised political leaders in 
the world, and was the figurehead of an international ANC brand. In this capacity he 
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almost singlehandedly raised external funds for the ANC. Leaders from around the 
world were keen to be seen supporting the new government. At the same time it was 
an ANC strategy to develop relationships with the international community and much 
of Mandela’s time in office was spent overseas.  
A large proportion of these external funds came from regimes that were having their 
own problems in engaging with the international community. Part of the success in 
attracting funds was based on the willingness of the ANC to trade in diplomatic 
recognition for funds. For example, money was donated from the regimes of: 
Suharto in Indonesia, a brutal military dictatorship; King Fahd in Saudi Arabia, a 
dictatorial monarchy dependent on corruption and rent seeking; and Sani Abacha, 
the former president of Nigeria linked to gross human rights violations236. These 
diplomatic relationships were very explicitly based on the ANC’s need for funds. The 
Taiwanese Ambassador to South Africa noted that the main contact point within the 
inner circle at the top of the ANC was in fact Treasurer General Thomas Nkobi237.  
The second funding model used by the ANC was even more controversial than the 
first. The ‘Comrades in Arms’ funding model was based on the party deploying 
cadres into positions in business in the private sector. In return for government 
tenders and beneficial political decisions, these individuals would then make large 
donations to the ANC party funds. This was conducted in the environment of 
empowerment and so it was relatively easy for the party to deploy its faithful into the 
upper echelons of the business community. This type of behaviour is covered in this 
dissertation in the section on BEE and clientelism. The ‘Comrades in Arms’ model 
became les favourable after the ANC was implicated in the ‘money for arms’ scam 
being run by the Iraqi government238.  
The party has used their access to the state to benefit from the use of electoral 
resources. In the 2009 electoral campaign the ANC were accused of distributing 
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state controlled food aid to supporters and away from those that may support 
opposition parties239. 
4.4 Corruption under Zuma 
Under the presidencies of Mandela and Mbeki political corruption in South Africa was 
characterised by the centralisation of power, and the dominance of the party. Under 
Zuma this has reversed to some extent. Starting with the political rivalry between 
Zuma and Mbeki, the nature of corruption in recent years has been more about the 
abuse of the state for internal political competition within the party, and the 
decentralisation of power. The decentralisation of power has created internal faction 
fighting, and the realisation within the alliance that the anti-Mbeki alliance that helped 
bring about the regime change was merely a ‘coalition of convenience’. 
4.4.1 Internal Political Competition and the Erosion of the State 
The abuse of state resources has increasingly been about internal faction fighting 
within the ANC rather than the expansion of the party’s influence. Not only has 
corruption been used as a political weapon, the means of uncovering such abuse 
has involved the politicisation of the police and security forces. 
Allegations of corruption have been used as a weapon against potential rivals. 
Accusations of corruption can be made against those that are perceived as a threat, 
thus eliminating the threat. By exposing the illegal activities of a rival, the leader 
should be able to maintain power. The classic example of this within the ANC were 
the allegations of corruption against Jacob Zuma. Zuma faced 16 counts of 
corruption, money laundering, fraud, and racketeering stemming from the multimillion 
dollar arms deal 240 . The charges came just days after Zuma was elected as 
President of the ANC241. This effectively put him as the next national president and 
thus a rival to Mbeki. The judge dismissed the charges against Zuma stating that the 
prosecutors had not followed procedures and that the charges appeared to be part of 
a politically motivated plot involving Thabo Mbeki242. Zuma’s statement that he was 
merely a provincial minister at the time of the deal lends credence the theory that this 
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was a politically motivated charge243. This is not to say that Zuma is not guilty of 
corruption, the evidence presented at the trial of Shabir Shaik’s suggests as much244. 
However what it does demonstrate is the using of corruption allegations by an 
incumbent as a political weapon to oust rivals. 
The link between this and the corruption of the political system is that invariably 
independent state bodies are used to fight political battles. For example, there has 
been a politicisation of the police and the security forces.  
The disbandment of the Directorate of Special Operations (DSO, or “scorpions”) 
prompted heavy criticism from outside the party accusing the party of exerting undue 
influence on the anti-corruption task force 245 . ANC Secretary General Gwede 
Mantashe admitted that the decision was taken in order to protect the ANC and its 
members246. It was a reaction to the unit’s investigations into top level ANC officials, 
including Jacob Zuma, Blade Nzimande, and Ngoako Ramatlhodi.  
Furthermore, state intelligence agencies have been used within the party to 
participate in internal faction fighting. This originated in the battle for power between 
Mbeki and Zuma and includes the fabrication of evidence in the hoax e-mail scandal 
and the political fall out emanating from the Browse Mole Report.  
4.4.2 Party Funding: “Politics and Business go Together” 
The politicisation of the state continued from the Mbeki presidency, however the use 
of state resources for internal faction fighting has increased, largely as a result of the 
political competition between Mbeki and Zuma and the transfer of power from one to 
the other.  
Another from of corruption that has continued, and changed in nature, is the 
corruption surrounding party funding. In 2007 it was revealed that the ANC has been 
selling face time with ministers in an organised scheme to bring business and 
government together. The practice was described as a “private ANC business 
                                            
243 R.W Johnson 2008 ‘After the rape trial a bid for the presidency’ Sunday times Oct 8 2008 
244 Shaik vs The State (2) (2006) SCA 134 (RSA) In the judgment it was stated that “Between 1996 and 2002 
Shaik and Mr Jacob Zuma engaged in what the trial court appropriately called a ‘generally corrupt relationship’” at 
[8] 













C. Vandome: VDMCHR002 Dissertation 23/1/2013 
77 
 
initiative to assist business people to network with ANC policy makers”247. There 
were three levels of membership with increasing charges, all of which went through 
Luthuli house.  
Under Zuma the use of the Progressive Business Forum (PBF) as a funding 
mechanism has increased. The party charges up to R60,000 for face time with the 
President. For a seat at the top table at an ANC dinner tickets can cost R500,000. 
The PBF defends itself by saying that they are providing information to the nation, 
and that it enables dialogue248. This is a rather tame defence of the PBF in contrast 
to Zuma’s own remarks: “Politics and business go together”249, and even stating that 
“Once business gets closer to a political party, you must know that things are going 
very well in the country”250. The selling of face time of MP’s and ministers represents 
a form of corruption that has remained legal, and yet has massive implications.  
This demonstrates a very open willingness of the ANC as a party to capitalise on the 
privileges it has in state office. Despite Smuts Ngonyama’s claims that it was 
“nonsensical” to suggest it was an abuse of state resources, it is clearly the abuse of 
public office in order to gain political and financial support for the party. 
Similarly to the Mbeki era, Chancellor House has continued to be the main 
investment vehicle for the ANC under Zuma and it remains to be controversial. The 
ANC has come under heavy criticism due to its ownership of a 25% stake in Hitachi 
though Chancellor House. The controversy arose after Hitachi obtained a contract to 
provide equipment for the building of a new power station. The project was being 
undertaken by Eskom and was a tender from the ANC. Thus, the implication was 
that companies in which Chancellor House has a stake are getting preferential 
treatment and securing state tenders.  
Such cases are consistently reported by the South African media, and often public 
outrage ensues. Yet despite this, none of the major parties is committed to reforming 
the ways in which political parties are funded. There have been a few calls for pure 
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state funding; however this is unlikely to happen. Firstly it would be a highly 
controversial move to allow the political party in power to allocate state resources to 
political parties. Secondly, and conversely, it would probably be less profitable than 
the ANC’s current funding model.  
4.4.3 BEE/BBBEE: Fall from grace? 
To a large extent the Black elite that came into existence in the late 1990’s and early 
2000’s has ‘fallen from grace’ in recent years251. This has been because of a number 
of reasons: The narrow focus, empowering only an elite few; the fact that it continued 
in an economic environment of increasing inequality; the vulgarity of the conspicuous 
conception with which it was associated; and most of all the air of corruption 
surrounding the policy and its beneficiaries252. This does not mean that all of the 
BEE/BBBEE deals and initiatives were corrupt and vulgar. In fact many were very 
effective. But the mass public perception of these initiatives as being founded on and 
perpetuating corruption demonstrates that enough of them were corrupt for this 
image to be cemented in the minds of the public. 
The ability of the ANC to shake off these allegations and change the image of ANC 
links to the BEE elite was made more difficult by the internal faction fighting of the 
party. 
The corruption accusations surrounding Julius Malema are well known and most of 
them relate to corruption which is systemic, rather than systematic in nature. 
However, the call for the nationalisation of the mines demonstrates the power of the 
voice that the BEE elite has within the party. 
Many members of the new black elite bought into supposedly safe sectors of the 
South African economy, principally the mining sector. These investments were 
funded by large loans. Investors borrowed with the expectation that the yield on their 
investments would be larger than the interest on their loans. However post 2008 the 
South African economy has been hit by the global recession. With some mineral 
prices falling, such as platinum, of which South Africa is a major producer, and 
increasingly bad labour relations, share prices in the mining sector have not risen as 
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expected, and the JSE took a massive hit following the credit crisis of 2008. The 
result of these economic factors is that BEE entrepreneurs that borrowed large sums 
to invest in mining are in severe trouble. 
The calls for nationalisation of the mining sector by the ANC-YL are essentially calls 
for a bail out for the black capital invested in mining. The support for such a policy on 
the right of the ANC has been fiercely fought by the left. Despite nationalisation 
being one of their priorities, they are not keen on paying over the odds in order to 
bail out a nascent capitalist elite. The inference suggests that there exists an elite 
class with strong political connections who have conducted themselves in a manner 
which demonstrates their unsuitability for running the mining sector253. 
 
4.5 The ANC and Political Corruption: Conclusion 
The number of scandals and the persistence of media reporting on corruption have 
driven the ANC to produce much rhetoric on anti-corruption initiatives. However, it is 
mainly just rhetoric. There has been no clear sign that the ANC has adopted a 
stronger stance on corruption and the adoption of strong anticorruption measures. 
The ANC inherited a state that had for a long time functioned entirely on a system of 
corruption. There was also institutionalised corruption in the public sector. There was 
also a legacy of corruption within the ANC organisational structure from its years of 
existence as a liberation movement, characterised by secrecy, the centralisation of 
power, and illicit relationships with organised crime.  
When they came into power the party had no experience of government and some 
ministers succumbed to the incentives for corruption inherent in public office. They 
had a mandate that was based on the support of the poor black majority. In order to 
bolster this political support with economic capabilities the ANC created its own black 
capitalist elite.  
However, what this chapter has demonstrated is that corruption in South Africa has 
been largely systematic. While there has been an amount of systemic corruption, 
much of what has taken place has been either within the system, or as a result of it. 
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This chapter highlights elements of the South African political system that cause 
corruption or are open to abuse. The bureaucratic, electoral, and party systems all 
have a bearing on the nature of corruption in the country.  In particular, the 
regulations surrounding party funding allow for parties to engage in corruption.  
The cases that followed support these assertions that corruption in the ANC is in part 
due to the nature of the political system of South Africa. Systematic corruption in 
South Africa includes the blurring of the party state divide through the politicisation of 
the bureaucracy, the security services, and other arms of the state. It also includes 
the selling of political capital through party funding mechanisms and the creation of a 
new elite capitalist class. 
With a lack of external constraints the ANC has been able to abuse the powers of 
the state. Internal rather than external competition holds those at the top 
accountable. Those who go against the party such as Feinstein or Charlton do not 
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5: Conclusion: Do the IFIs have an accurate understanding of Political 
Corruption? 
This dissertation argues that the IFIs’ understanding of corruption, and thus their 
anticorruption and good governance policies and prescriptions, is based on the 
conceptualisation of corruption as a state centric phenomenon. As such, they are not 
concerned with corruption as a systematic problem. The dissertation has shown both 
in the theory and in the case of South Africa how systematic corruption occurs, 
including the blurring of the distinction between the party and the state, as well as 
the impact of electoral and party systems. Much of the corruption in South Africa 
occurs systematically and involves the abuse of state resources, cadre deployment, 
and the issues surrounding party funding.  
The IFIs’ definitions and views, although legitimate, prudent, and legal, are actually 
the road to ineffectiveness. For the IFIs to develop effective anti-corruption and good 
governance programmes that target ‘state capture’ and political corruption, rather 
than simply targeting bribe paying and bureaucratic corruption, they would need to 
delve into domestic politics and political systems. Such political involvement would 
entail a great deal of risk on their part, and would be beyond their mandate and their 
appetite.  
The policies and prescriptions of the IFIs are proving to be effective in targeting 
some forms of corruption. Fiscal transparencies together with transparent capital 
flows allow corruption to be identified and the IFIs have targeted these areas 
effectively. So for targeting the monetary, state centric forms of corruption, and in 
particular targeting corruption within IFI projects, the World Bank and IMF have been 
successful. However, for general policy purposes that target causes of corruption at 
the systematic level, the views of the IFIs are too narrow and limited.  
Anti-corruption and good governance measures need to involve capacity building 
and bureaucratic and governance building. Naming and shaming is ineffective, and 
the embarrassment involved often incentivises governments to cover up corruption 
rather than deal with it in a transparent manner. This type of assistance is beyond 
the scope of the IFIs, but in order for specific prescriptions to work, there needs to be 
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systematic corruption, the role of political parties, and the pervasive blurring of the 
state/party divide.    
In order to demonstrate this, this dissertation presents an overview of political 
corruption and the important role of the party in both the causes and consequences 
of systematic political corruption. The focus is on the relationship between the 
political party and the various systems of governance.  
The dissertation then analyses the views of the IFIs as revealed through their 
published literature and policies. The conceptual understandings of these institutions 
are tested against the initial framework developed in chapter 2. The analysis of the 
IFIs indicates that the understanding of corruption that they have is state centric. 
This is largely due to the mandates of the institutions and the limitations of the 
prescriptions they have at their disposal. The dissertation demonstrates that they 
have both a limited conceptual framework of corruption within political parties and a 
limited mandate to address it. Their understanding is driven by empirical research 
and quantitative analysis. This prioritises unorganised bureaucratic corruption over 
the more organised and covert political corruption because measuring corruption is 
dependent upon measuring the perceptions of corruption. There are more agents 
involved in bureaucratic corruption, it is more overt, and it is more recognisable. The 
prescriptions that derive from this understanding focus on reforming economic 
institutions rather than changing political systems. 
The reason why neither the World Bank nor the IMF focuses on systematic political 
corruption is because of their original purpose and mandate. The Bank is essentially 
a development fund and the IMF is a lender of last resort. The need for anti-
corruption efforts was originally identified as a means of preventing corruption in the 
use of IFI loans. This has now broadened and the IFIs are among the leaders of the 
global good governance initiatives. Yet despite this broader attention, their views are 
unchanged. As such, state centric policies will be ineffective in regimes where 
corruption is systematic. 
After analysing the understanding of corruption held by the IFIs against the broader 
theory, the dissertation looks at the case of the ANC. The case is presented to 
analyse whether an understanding of political corruption is necessary. The 
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importance of political parties and the manipulation of political power involved in 
corrupt relationships.  
This case demonstrates that the South African political system is a cause of 
corruption and is open to abuse. The bureaucratic, electoral, and party systems all 
have a bearing on the nature of corruption in the country.  In particular, the 
regulations surrounding party funding allow for parties to engage in corruption.  
The specific cases under the presidencies of Mandela and Mbeki, and then Zuma, 
support these assertions that corruption in the ANC is in part due to the nature of the 
political system of South Africa. Systematic corruption in South Africa includes the 
blurring of the party state divide through the politicisation of the bureaucracy, the 
security services, and other arms of the state. It also includes the selling of political 
capital through party funding mechanisms and the creation of a new elite capitalist 
class. 
In the allocation of tenders and the development of a liberal and capitalist society, as 
idealised by the IFIs, the ANC benefited though corruption. A capitalist elite has 
developed though the Party rewarding those loyal to it. This is based on the loyalty 
networks built up through the Party’s history as a liberation movement.  
The party has also used its dominant position to politicise the functions of the state. 
The ANC has rewarded positions based on patronage, rather than merit which has 
undermined the state both politically and economically.  
The case demonstrates the systematic nature of corruption and highlights certain 
characteristics and conceptualisations of corruption that the IFIs do not address. In 
so doing the case suggests that following state centric prescription is the road to 
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